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INTRODUCTION

On the eve of the Supreme Court's fateful decision in the Cleveland voucher case,I only the most ostrich-like Separationist could have
denied the flux in the law of the Establishment Clause. In the context
of access of private parties to public fora for purposes of religious expression,2 and direct government transfer of material resources to religious institutions," norms of non-Establishment have been tending
sharply toward the paradigm of Neutrality and away from the metaphorical wall of church-state separation. Only in the area of government speech on religious matters, such as school-sponsored prayer or
religious holiday displays, has the law moved toward increased separa4
tion between religion and government.
I Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
2 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (requiring equal
access to a program of religious instruction for children at an elementary school);
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. ofVa., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (requiring equal
access to printing subsidies for student journal written from a religious perspective);
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (requiring equal
access for privately sponsored cross in public forum on plaza next to statehouse);
Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (concerning equal access for religiously oriented films about family life); Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263 (1981) (concerning equal access to university facilities for religious student groups).
3 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (upholding government lending of edtIcational materials and equipment to private religious schools); Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203 (1997) (upholding government sending public school teachers into private religious schools to provide remedial education for disadvantaged students).
4 See Santa Fe indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding that student
led prayer at football games violated Establishment Clause); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577 (1992) (holding that religious invocations and benedictions at graduation violated Establishment Clause); County-of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989)
(holding that creche in cotnty courthouse violated Establishment Clause). But see
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that city-sponsored nativity scene did
not violate Establishment Clause); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (holding
that opening prayer at state legislature did not violate Establishment Clause). For
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Zelman represents the most recent and dramatic move away from
Separationism. By holding in no uncertain terms that the Cleveland
school voucher program satisfies constitutional requirements, the Supreme Court has opened the door for a wide range of relationships,
once thought impermissible, between government and religious institutions. The key to these new relationships, the Court held, is the
concept of "true,"5 "genuine,"' ! and "independent"7 private choice to
partake of services offered by religious entities. For the first time, the
law explicitly permits government to spend money for the payment of
tuition at religious elementary and secondary schools, even if those
schools offer faith-intensive academic programs. The Court's decision
places absolutely no restriction on the use of the tuition funds received by participating schools.
The outcome in Zelman, decided by a vote of five to four, may
have been close, but the question it answers has now been firmly resolved. Unlike other hotly disputed areas of constitutional law, such
as state sovereign immunity or the death penalty, in which a fractured
Court promises only future litigation, uncertainty, and a fair
probability of a pendulum swing, the voucher decision both captures
the trajectory of contemporary Establishment Clause jurisprudence
and resolves a particular question in a way highly unlikely to be
revisited.

8

The certainty of the resolution in Zelman is not matched, however, by the adequacy of its justifications and its reasoning. Even the
most ardent fans of vouchers should recognize the costs of a radically
untheorized invocation of "private choice" as a response to deeply felt,
long-held constitutional concerns. When the grounds upon which
such an important decision rests are unexplained, or are attributed
analysis and defense of the evolution of different norms for cases involving government financial support of religious institutions and government messages promoting
worship, see generally Ira C. Lupu, Government Money and Government Messages: Santa
Fe, Mitchell v. Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV.
771 (2001) (describing the shift friom concerns over money payment to religious organizations toward concerns over religiously partisan government speech).
5 Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2466-67, 2473.
6 Id. at 2465-67, 2469-70, 2473.
7 Id. at 2465-68.
8 Professor Fried characterized the Zelman dissents, especially that ofJustice Souter, as "oppositional," and he worried that the four dissenters in Zelman are committed to turning back the clock of the Establishment Clause. Charles Fried, Comment,
Five to Four: Reflections on the School Voucher Case, 116 HARV. L. REv. 163 (2002). We
think that the trend is too pronounced, and its crystallization in actual practice too
advanced, to make Professor Fried's concern a realistic one.
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disingenuously and entirely to unelaborated principles laid down in
prior cases, its future is left to twist in the winds created by its critics.
We think much can be said for the first premises in Zelman, but
the decision's underpinnings require explication if they are to be sufficiently grounded in constitutional values. Moreover, Zelman is only
the beginning, not the termination point, of constitutional litigation
over voucher arrangements. In what follows, we explore the Zelman
opinions, the questions those opinions suggest but fail to answer, and
the implications of the decision for the future of relations between the
state and religious entities. In Part I, we first describe the constitutional crossroads at which the Zelman Court found itself,9 and then
offer a close reading of the Zelman opinions, paying special attention
to the normative vision of church-state relations that each presupposes, the values that the Court failed to explore, and practical questions about the range of school settings to which Zelman might
ultimately be applied.
Part II explores the legal and constitutional future of the voucher
movement, with respect to education as well as other social services.
Part II.A focuses on knotty questions of state constitutional law, and its
interplay with federal constitutional norms, that have already begun
to arise in Zelman's wake. Indeed, the ink in Zelman was barely dry
when a Florida Circuit Court ruled that the Florida Opportunity
Scholarship Program violated the church-state provisions of the Florida Constitution,"' and a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held in Davey v. Locke' I that a church-state provision in
the Washington Constitution, as applied in a particular case, violated
the federal Free Exercise Clause. Part II.B explores the debate about
regulatory conditions that might be imposed upon providers in
voucher programs in light of the Supreme Court's tangled jurisprudence of unconstitutional conditions and religious accommodation.
Here, we explore conditions related to school performance, student
admissions, faculty hiring, and controversial expression by providers.
Finally, Part II.C analyzes the importance of Zelman outside the field
of education, by probing the decision's implications for President
Bush's Faith-Based Initiative-that is, for efforts by government to en9 We began this task in an earlier piece, in which we analyzed the constitutional
problem of voucher financing of government-supported services of all kinds, as that
problem stood on the eve of Zelman. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sites of Redemption: A Wide-Angle Look at Government Vouchers and Sectarian Setvice Providers, 18 J.L. &

PoL. 537 (2002). That piece went to press too late to include anything more than a
brief post-script about ZelMan. This Article begins where that one left off.
10 Holmes v. Bush, No. CV 99-3370, 2002 WL 1809079 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 5, 2002).
11 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002).
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list and finance faith-based organizations in providing social services.
In this context, too, Zelman has had immediate impact, as revealed by
the recent decision of a federal district court in Wisconsin to uphold a
voucher-type arrangement for state financing of a faith-intensive drug
2
rehabilitation program. '
I.

A.

ZELMAN

Background

The voucher controversy arose from a crisis in Cleveland's public
school system, which was generally regarded as one of the worst in the
nation. Dismal. and worsening rates of educational achievement
prompted a federal district court judge to transfer control of the
Cleveland schools to the state.' 3 In 1996, responding to this crisis,
Ohio enacted the Pilot Project Scholarship Program, which offers several options to parents of Cleveland schoolchildren. Under the Scholarship Program, Cleveland parents can receive a tuition voucher
redeemable either at participating private schools in Cleveland, or at
participating public schools in districts adjacent to Cleveland.' 4 Alternatively, parents whose children remain in Cleveland's public schools
can choose to receive a voucher for after-school tutoring. '5 Both the
tuition and tutoring vouchers give priority to low-income families.'"
Voucher opponents, led by teachers' unions and People for the
American Way, challenged the Scholarship Program the moment it
was enacted. The challengers claimed that the program violated the
federal and Ohio state constitutions because the tuition vouchers
could be redeemed at religious schools-indeed the majority of participating private schools were religious. The Ohio Supreme Court
12 Freedom from Religion Found. v. McCallum, 214 F. Stipp. 2d 905 (W.D. Wis.
2002) (McCallum II), affd, No. 02-3102, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 6301 (7th Cir. Apr. 2, 2003).
Six months earlier, in the same litigation, the court ruled that direct financing by the
state of the same faith-intensive provider violated the Establishment Clause. Freedom
from Religion Found. v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950 (W.D Wis. 2002) (McCallum

1).
13 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2463 (2002).
14 Id. The plan paid a maximum of $2250 per child per year for tuition; participating private schools had to agree to charge no more than $2500 per year, leaving a
$250 co-payment to be made by the family. No adjacent public school districts have
ever agreed to participate in the program. Id. at 2464.
15

Id. at 2463. The tutoring grants paid 90% of annual tutoring costs per child,

tip to an annual maximum of $360. Id. at 2464.
16 The program gave priority for scholarships to families with incomes below
200% of the poverty line. Id. If more children seek scholarships than the Program

can offer, the scholarships are distributed by lottery. Id.
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found that the voucher program legislation violated a technical requirement of the Ohio Constitution, and thus held the program invalid.17 The Ohio legislature quickly remedied the technical defect and
re-enacted the voucher program. Again the opponents filed suit to
block the program, though this time in federal district court. The
federal district court ruled that the voucher program violated the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit upheld that ruling, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. At each judicial level, courts stayed injunctive relief pending final resolution of the case in order to avoid educational
disruption for those families who were already participating in the
program. By the time the Supreme Court announced its decision in
Zelman, the voucher program had been operating for six years.
In Zelman, the Court faced the intersection-one might say collision-of two distinct lines of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
The first, exemplified by Committee for Public Education and Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist,' s prohibited substantial, unrestricted government
support for religious primary and secondary schools. Nyquist, decided
in 1973, invalidated New York's program of tuition grants and tax
credits for low and middle income parents whose children attended
private elementary and secondary schools. The overwhelming majority of beneficiaries of the program were parents with children in Catholic schools. Despite the fact that the aid ran to the parents and not
directly to the schools, the Nyquist Court held that the program was a
nonneutral attempt to ensure the financial survival of religious
schools. As such, it violated then-controlling Separationist principlesl' by having a "primary effect"2 of advancing religion and by pro-

moting "political divisiveness" along sectarian lines. 2 '
To voucher opponents, the Ohio Scholarship Program ran directly against the principles of Nyquist's "no-aid separationism." In
Cleveland, religious schools offered nearly all of the available seats for
voucher students; the program placed no restrictions on the use of
17 Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999) (holding the Scholarship
Program a violation of the state constitution's prohibition on multiple subject matters
within a single bill).
18 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
19 The Court decided Nyquist within a few years of its germinal decision in Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), which set the template for decisions involving aid to
sectarian schools. Although the framework of Lemon has been modified somewhat, its
approach still controls programs of direct aid from government to sectarian schools.
See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 218-19 (1997).
20 Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 774.
21 Id. at 796 (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623).
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voucher funds; and the program did not require participating religious schools to allow voucher students to "opt out" of religious education or worship. The program thus appeared to advance religion, in
22
violation of Separationist principles.
To voucher supporters, however, the case for the Ohio Program
tracked a second and more recent line of Establishment Clause decisions, running from Mueller v. Allen2 3 through Witters v. Washington
Department of Services for the Blind24 to Zobrest v. CatalinaFoothills School
District.2 5 In Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest, the Court rejected Establish-

ment Clause challenges to programs in which government funds
reached religious institutions only "as a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients." 26 These intervening
independent choices, the Court reasoned, disconnected the government from any religious experience that a given beneficiary might receive along with-or as part of-the services "purchased" with the
government's assistance. In arguing that the Ohio program offered
such independent choices, voucher supporters pointed !to the wide
range of educational options available to Cleveland parents, which included publicly supported magnet schools, independent but public
community (charter) schools, tuition scholarships to private schools,
and tutoring scholarships for those who remained in any public
27
school.
The Court's resolution of the conflict in the decisional law between Nyquist and strenuous no-aid Separationism, on the one hand,
and the theory of intervening private choice, on the other, cannot be
understood without an appraisal of its paradigm-confronting decision
in Mitchell v. Helms. 28

Mitchell involved an as-applied challenge to a

joint federal-state program that loaned educational equipment and
materials-for example, books, computers, software, video players,
and video tapes-to schools, public and private, in low-income areas.
The governing statute limited these materials to "secular, neutral, and
22 This argument persuaded a majority of the Sixth Circuit panel in Zehnan to
strike down the program. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000),
rev'd, 536 U.S. 639, 122 S.Ct. 2460 (2002).
23 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
24 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
25 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
26

Witters, 474 U.S. at 488; see also Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 9 (quoting Witters, 474 U.S.

at 488). Mueller used similar language, holding aid as permissible as it was "controlled
by the private choices of individual parents." Mueller, 463 U.S. at 400.
27 For the Zelman Court's discussion of magnet schools and community (charter)
schools, see Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2464.
28 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
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non-ideological" uses.2 9 Several precedents from the Nyquist era had
held similar programs unconstitutional, because they transferred substantial aid to religious education.3 11 Mitchell overruled those precedents, and dramatically recast the Supreme Court line-up in cases
involving direct aid to religious institutions.
Four Justices-Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, Justice
Scalia, and Justice Thomas, all of whom are part of the Zelman majority-joined a plurality opinion in Mitchell that made formal neutrality
and secular purpose the only Establishment Clause requirements for a
direct aid program. So long as the program had been designed to
advance secular ends-in Mitchell, the secular educational purpose appeared quite obvious-and encompassed a broad class of schools,
both religious and secular, the plurality declared its willingness to uphold it."'
The Mitchell plurality also explicitly and vehemently repudiated a
central tenet of the Separationist ethos. From the time of Lemon v.
Kurtzman3 2 until the decision in Mitchell, the Court had repeatedly insisted that the state could not aid "pervasively sectarian" institutions.3"
Such aid, the reasoning went, would either advance religion or excessively entangle the state with religion in the effort to be sure that the
aid went exclusively to secular uses. Reciting persuasive evidence of
the anti-Catholic provenance of this doctrine, the plurality concluded
that the doctrine had been the product of religious bigotry and
3 4

should be abandoned.

Three Justices-Justice Ginsburg, Justice Souter, and Justice Ste35
vens, all of whom dissented in Zelman as well-dissented in Mitchell.
Hewing to all of the premises of no-aid Separationism, they insisted
that the program violated the Establishment Clause because it advanced religion in at least two ways-by freeing up private resources
29 Id. at 802 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 7372(a)(1) (2000)).
30 See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530
U.S. 793 (2000); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), overruled by Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
31 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 808.
32 403 U.S. 602 (1971). As recently as 1988, ChiefJustice Rehnquist authored an
opinion which appeared to reaffirm this doctrine, Bowen. v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 610
(1988), despite Justices Kennedy and Scalia's attempt in that case to repudiate it. Id.
at 624 (Scalia & Kennedy, JJ., concurring).
33 See, e.g., Bowen, 487 U.S. at 610. But see id. at 624 (Scalia & Kennedy, .[.,concurring) (challenging validity of classifying institutions as "pervasively sectarian").
34 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828-29; see also Columbia Union Coll. v. Clark, 527 U.S.
1013 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (urging the Court to
abandon the doctrine that bars aid to "pervasively sectarian" institutions).
35 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 867-913 (Souter, j., dissenting).
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for religious teaching,- 6 and by creating a substantial risk of diversion
37
of government assistance to religious uses.
Justices Breyer and O'Connor-whose votes split in Zelman-cast
the deciding votes in Mitchell in a concurring opinion that currently
represents the governing law on direct government aid to religious
entities."8 The O'Connor-Breyer opinion rejected the premises of
both the plurality and the dissents. For the concurring Justices, the
plurality went too far in the direction of Establishment Clause Neutralism;3 9 secular purpose and neutral coverage criteria are indeed
constitutionally necessary, but not sufficient to satisfy the Establishment Clause. What is also required, in direct aid cases, is assurance
that the government's assistance is not in fact being used for specifically religious activities, such as worship. But the concurring Justices
similarly rejected the dissent's broad, prophylactic approach to assuring that state aid was not so used; courts, the concurring opinion concluded, must look at the precise ways in which government aid is
being used, not simply at the identity of the recipient institution.
Given this approach, the program challenged in Mitchell had sufficient safeguards against diversion to religious use, and therefore satisfied the Establishment Clause.
In light of the backdrop provided by Mitchell, it was hardly a surprise that defenders of the Ohio Scholarship Program targeted Justice
O'Connor as the key vote. They needed but one to add to the four in
the Mitchell plurality, for whom the secular purpose and formal neutrality of the voucher plan would suffice. Justice Breyer's vote was
hard to predict; his joining in the Mitchell concurrence had come as a
bit of a surprise. By contrast, Justice O'Connor had evidenced strong
prior interest in this field, 4 and her jurisprudential style frequently
36 Id. at 896 (Souter,J., dissenting).
37 Id. at 908-09 (Souter, J., dissenting).
38 Id. at 836-67 (O'Connor,.J. concurring). This concurrence represents the narrowest ground supporting the result and thus operates as the Court's holding. Marks
v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). We believe that the Mitchell concurrence
supports cash grants as well as in-kind assistance to faith-based organizations, so long
as the grants are accompanied by safeguards against diversion to religious use. For a
narrower view of Mitchell, see David Saperstein, Public Accountability and Faith-Based
Organizations:A Problem Best Avoided, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1353, 1378-80 (2003).
39 We elaborate on the general paradigms of Religion Clause Separationism and
Neutralism in Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities
In. Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37 (2002); and Lupu & Tuttle, supra note

9.
40 Justice O'Connor is the author of the "endorsement" theory of Establishment
Clause adjudication, see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor,..,
concurring), a theory that has become the law in cases involving religious speech by
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revealed tendencies to be fact-specific and flexible in her approach.
Moreover, she had joined in Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest, the three
lynchpins of the theory supporting "independent choice" as the crucial variable. If the voucher proponents lostJustice Breyer's vote, they
could still win with Justice O'Connor's; but if they lost Justice
O'Connor's vote, they were highly likely to lose the case.
That Justice O'Connor's vote was crucial to the outcome created
tactical questions for both sides. Arguments that the Cleveland program was formally neutral between religion and nonreligion were necessary but not sufficient to win her support. She had to be persuaded
by arguments about "private choice." Voucher proponents concen41
trated their arguments precisely and strenuously on that point.
Voucher opponents, by contrast, did not want to concede that any
voucher program-no matter how ample the choice-was constitutional. They concentrated their arguments on Nyquist and its place in
the theory of no-aid Separationism. 42 Zelman was won and lost on
these tactical decisions, and the opinions it produced can only be appreciated in light of what divided as well what united their authors on
the eve of decision.
B.

The Zelman Opinions: Explication and Critique

Those looking beyond the result to the possibility of nuance, constitutional innovation, or normative depth in resolving the momentous conflict presented in Zelman cannot have been satisfied by the
opinions. By a five-to-four vote, the Court upheld the constitutionality
of the Ohio Scholarship Program; "independent choice" trumped
"no-aid separationism." The Court opinion treats the matter, however, as if it were solely a question of choosing the applicable precedents, rather than resolving a fundamental conflict in the prior law.
The primary virtue of the opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
resides in the fact that it commanded a majority, in contrast to the
fragmentation of the majority in Mitchell v. Helms. Justices O'Connor
government. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 590-91 (1989). She is also
the author of the most immediate, pre-Mitchell case involving aid to religious schools,
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), which overruled prior law and began to blaze a
new, more fact-dependent trail in direct-aid cases.
41 See Reply Brief of State Petitioner at 1-16, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S.
Ct. 2460 (2002) (No. 00-1751); Brief for United States at 1, 3-4, 8-11, 13-14, 16-18,
20, 23, 28-29, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002) (No. 00-1751).
42 See Brief of Respondent Simmons-Harris at 5-17, 19, 22-28, 33-36, 39-40,
42-44, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002) (No. 00-1751); Brief of Respondent Gatton 4-6, 8, 13-22, 31-34, 36-37, 46-49, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122
S. Ct. 2460 (2002) (No. 00-1751).
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and Thomas wrote concurring opinions, while Justices Souter, Breyer,
43
and Stevens authored dissents.
1.

The Court Opinion (Chief Justice Rehnquist)

An opinion of the Supreme Court, or indeed of any appellate
court, should fulfill a number of functions, but at least two of these
are central. First, the opinion should provide guidance that is sufficiently clear to enable lawyers and lower court judges to make decisions in future, relevantly similar cases. Second, the opinion should
make a reasonable attempt to justify the Court's decision as something
more principled than judicial fiat.4 4 The Zelman majority opinion succeeds in the first task, but falls far short in the second.
a.

The Bright Line of Private Choice

From the beginning of his analysis, the Chief Justice moved to
ground familiar even to those only casually acquainted with the Byzantine turns of Establishment Clause jurisprudence-the Lemon test, or
at least the two parts remaining after Agostini v. Felton.45 Lemon's first
prong, the requirement that the challenged program must have a secular purpose, took the Court but a single sentence to dispatch: "There
is no dispute that the program challenged here Was enacted for the
valid secular purpose of providing educational assistance to poor children in a demonstrably failing public school system." 46 The second
inquiry-whether the challenged program has the "primary effect" of
"advancing or inhibiting" religion 47-proved the more challenging.
With respect to the "effects" test, the Court identified a sharp distinction in Establishment Clause law between programs of direct aid to
religious schools and indirect aid, defined as "programs of true private
choice, in which government aid reaches religious schools only as a
result of the genuine and independent choices of private individu43 All four dissenters, includingJustice Ginsburg, joined Justice Souter's dissent.
Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2485 (SouterJ., dissenting). Justices Stevens and Souter, but not
Justice Ginsburg, joined Justice Breyer's dissent. Id. at 2502 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
And Justice Stevens-who had joined the other two dissents-wrote a dissent for himself only. Id. at 2484 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44 STEVEN BURTON,JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH 35-68 (1992) (arguing that an adjudication is legitimate or not based on the types of reasons the adjudicator invokes).

45

521 U.S. at 203. Agostini collapsed what had been separate inquiries of ad-

vancement of religion and "excessive entanglement" into a single inquiry into forbidden religious effects.
46 Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2465.

47

Id.
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als." 4x Although direct aid cases have blazed the erratic trail of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the Court declared that indirect aid
cases stand in a "consistent and unbroken" line, in which the Court
has considered three "true private choice programs" and upheld them
4
all. 9
Thus, for the majority, the main question to be answered was
whether or not the Ohio Pilot Scholarship Program constituted indirect aid. To answer that question, the Court identified three criteria
present in the earlier indirect aid cases. As a threshold requirement,
5'
the aid program must be "neutral in all respects toward religion." 1
By this, the Court simply means formal neutrality-the classes of both
the participating schools and the eligible students must be defined in
non-religious terms. Because the Cleveland program was open to any
private school in the district and any public school in the adjacent
districts, and the only preferred students were those who come from
lower income families, the Court found this criteria satisfied in
5
Zelman. '
Next, the program must provide aid "directly to a broad class of
individuals, defined without reference to religion. '5 2 This criterion,
which originated in Mueller v. Allen,53 ensures that the formal neutrality required by the first criterion does not in fact represent a gerrymander in favor of a particular religious group; the more dispersed
the benefits, the less likely any one religious group would be considered the intended beneficiary of government largesse. The Cleveland
voucher scheme was open to parents "of a school-age child who resides in the Cleveland City School District, '54 which represented a
beneficiary class sufficiently broad to meet this standard.
Although criteria concerning program neutrality were enough to
satisfy four of the Justices in the majority, these standards do not in
and of themselves make the aid indirect, so the Court's final inquiry
turned out to be the dispositive one in maintaining a majority. The
aid recipients must be "empowered to direct the aid to schools or institutions of their own choosing." 55 The Court found that the Cleveland program offered parents a wide array of options: "They may
remain in public school as before, remain in public school with pub48
49
50
51
52

Id.

53
54
55

463 U.S. 388, 397 (1983).
Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2468.
Id. at 2466-67.

Id. at 2466.

2467.
Id. at 2468.
Id.
[d. at

2003]

ZELMAN'S

FUTURE

licly funded tutoring aid, obtain a scholarship and choose a religious
school, obtain a scholarship and choose a private nonreligious school,
enroll in a community school, or enroll in a magnet school. ' 56 Each
of these choices had consequences for the allocation of public
resources.
Taken together, these criteria comprise the Court's image of legitimate indirect aid programs as "circuit breakers" between the government and religious institutions. 57 If government has acted
neutrally in establishing the programmby defining the providers and
beneficiaries without respect to religion-and if the beneficiaries select the provider they will use, then government is constitutionally disconnected from any religious provider that a given beneficiary might
choose.
Through its articulation of this "circuit breaker" image, the Court
has provided stark and well-defined answers to three of the fundamental constitutional questions concerning voucher plans for primary and
secondary education:
i. Does the voucher form offinancing have constitutional significance?
Whether or not Chief Justice Rehnquist simply used the sharp distinction between direct and indirect financing to ensure that Justice
O'Connor joined in the majority opinion, a bright line now has been
enshrined in the law of the Establishment Clause. The majority recites the mantra of "true private choice" no less than fifteen times in a
relatively short opinion; 58 in the heart of its analysis, the majority uses
this refrain to close nearly every paragraph. "Private choice" serves as
the majority's answer to two critiques advanced by the dissenters, who
claimed that the percentage of available voucher seats located in religious schools, and the overall amount of government money flowing to
religious schools, should determine the constitutionality of a given
program.
To both challenges, the majority provides the same answer: because of the intervening private choice exercised by beneficiaries
(within a neutral program), the government is not responsible for the
amount of money that ends up in the hands of religious institutions,
nor is the government responsible for the percentage of students who
choose seats in religious schools, or even the percentage of seats open
to voucher students that are found in religious schools. Each of those

56
57

Id. at 2469.
Id. at 2467.

58

See, e.g., id. at 2465-67, 2473.
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statistics is created by demographic forces or choices, either personal
or institutional, outside the government's control and responsibility.59ii. How should the relevant universe of choices be defined? This question turned out to be absolutely central to the disposition of the case.
The Court's decisions in Mueller"1 ' Witters,6' and Zobrest",2 signaled the
importance of private choice for Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
but left wide open the question of how to measure the range of available choices. Presumably, a "choice" program that leaves beneficiaries
with only one choice, and a religious one at that, would not qualify as
a "genuine choice" between secular and religious options. Witters and
Zobrest involved programs that offered virtually unlimited choices.6 3
In Witters, the voucher program allowed recipients to choose any
4
school or program offering vocational training in virtually any field."
The program at issue in Zobrest entitled hearing-impaired students to
the assistance of government-financed sign-language interpreters at
any school they attended, public or private, secular or religious. 65 In
neither of these cases did religious schools make up a significant portion of the available choices.
In contrast, the Ohio Scholarship Program offered parents a considerably narrower range of choices. On its face, the program offered
three options: vouchers for use at public schools in adjacent districts;
vouchers to pay for private tutoring services for students remaining in
Cleveland public schools; and vouchers for use at private schools in
Cleveland."" The first option was illusory-no public school district in
the Cleveland metropolitan area was willing to take Cleveland voucher
59 Id. at 2469-70.
60 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
61 Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
62 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
63 Mueller involved a tax deduction for, among other things, tuition at private
elementary and secondary schools, rather than a direct government transfer to religious institutions. A large percentage of the private schools were religious, but the
Court rejected the idea that the constitutionality of the scheme should turn in any
way on the demography of the relevant schools. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 400-01.
64 Witters, 474 U.S. at 487-89. Washington excluded only religious training programs from its funding, and asserted that the Establishment Clause required such an
exclusion; the Court held that it does not-although the Washington Supreme Court
later held that the state constitution's religion clause did bar state payments for religious training. The Washington Supreme Court's ruling has lately come under federal
constitutional attack in Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002). See infra notes
202-04 and accompanying text.
65 Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10-12. Like Witters, Zobrest involved a claim by program
administrators that the Establishment Clause barred the use of program funds to support religious education, and again the Court held that it does not.
66 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2463-64 (2002).
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students. 67 The second option could hardly count as an equal alternative to private-school tuition; the tutoring voucher offered a maximum
of $360, or approximately $10 per week for the school year. Religious
schools dominated the third option; they offered nearly 97% of the
voucher seats in the 1999-2000 academic year.
The Court rejected such a narrow construction of the choices
available to Cleveland parents. In a voucher program, the Court held,

the relevant range of options should not be restricted to the options
created by the challenged program. Instead, the Court said that the
range should be measured
...from the perspective of Cleveland parents looking to choose the
best educational option for their school-age children. Parents who
choose a [voucher] program school in fact receive from the State
precisely what parents who choose a community or magnet school
receive-the opportunity to send their children largely at state expense to schools they prefer to their local public school.18
Seen in that context, voucher seats in religious schools account
for a much smaller percentage of the state-financed educational alternatives. 69 The majority's analysis of this point, unlike Justice
O'Connor's, did not focus on the subjective experience of parents
choosing schools.7 11 Although it referred to the "perspective of Cleveland parents," the Court adopted an objective determinant for the
range of choices, measured by the extent of Ohio's overall public support for education. "All options Ohio provides Cleveland schoolchildren ' 71 count as relevant choices from which parents may select.
iii.Who holds the burden of persuasion as to the "genuineand independent" nature of the voucher recipient's choice? The Court's answers to the
first two questions clarify most Establishment Clause questions about
the importance and relevant scope of beneficiary choice, but they do
not directly address the significance of the various adjectives modify67

Id. at 2464.

68 Id. at 2471 n.6. The Court expressed deep frustration at oral arguments that
those who challenged the program would not explain why community and magnet

schools should not be included in the relevant universe of choices. Id. at 2471. Note
that the Court provides an even broader description of the range of choices earlier in
its analysis, which includes even the existing neighborhood public schools. Id. at
2469; see also supra text accompanying note 56. For a spirited defense of including the
existing public schools in the relevant appraisal of choice, see Richard T. Weicher,
Note, If a PublicSchool Is Labeled "Failing,"Could More Really Be Less?, 77 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 293 (2001).
69 According to the Court's arithmetic, the percentage drops from 96% to less
than 20% of the available alternatives. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2471.
70 See infra text accompanying notes 96-135.
71 Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2469.
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ing "private choice," which include "genuine," "independent," and
"true. '17 2 The Court provided a subtle, but telling, response to this
issue: "[t]here . . . is no evidence that the program fails to provide

genuine opportunities for Cleveland parents to select secular educational options for their school-age children. '7:" At first glance, it appears that the Court has simply indicated that those who challenge a
voucher program on Establishment Clause grounds have the burden
of showing that the state has failed to make available "genuine"
choices to the parents making the selection.
While that conclusion is no doubt correct-and represents an important part of Zelman's legacy-the quotation reinforces a deeper insight about the Court's understanding of "genuine" choice.
"Genuine" modifies not the parents' act of choosing, but rather the
choices made available to them by the state. Although public schools
in the surrounding district do not contribute to genuine choice-no
seats were ever available in such schools-community and magnet
schools did have seats available, and those schools, whatever their academic merits, count as "genuine" choices under the Court's analysis.
As in its understanding of the range of available choices, the Court
declined to inquire into parents' subjective experiences in selecting
schools for their children. Parents might prefer School A over School
B on grounds of academic quality, value emphasis, and/or physical
safety, but prefer B over A because of the religious teaching at A. Parents in such circumstances are squeezed by the set of trade-offs
presented to them. The comparative quality or safety of the various
schools may generate pressure on parents to send their children to
religious schools, calling into question the "genuineness" of their
choice of a particular religious element to their child's education.
74
The Court's opinion, however, evinces no concern for their plight.
The majority's opinion thus provides clear direction for lawyers
and judges in future controversies over school vouchers, and a simple
roadmap for legislators contemplating the design of voucher programs. If a program is enacted for a secular purpose, defines the classes of schools and students in religion-neutral terms, offers benefits to
a broad set of students, and offers those students a variety of publiclyfinanced options-potentially including the neighborhood public
72

See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.

73

Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2469.

74 Indeed, the only indication that the Court has considered the state's actual
influence on parental choice reveals the majority's attitude toward any subjective inquily: "The Establishment Clause question is whether Ohio is coercing parents into
Id. Defined this narrowly-in terms
sending their children to religious schools ....
of coercion, rather than influence-the answer is obviously no.
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school-the program will survive any challenge under the Establishment Clause.
Analyzing voucher plans in circumstances other than Cleveland's
reinforces our sense of Zelman's clarity and scope. Consider, for a real
example, the Florida Opportunity Scholarship Program. 75 The program authorizes the payment of scholarships to the families of children whose public schools fail for two years in any four-year period to
pass state-wide tests of minimum adequacy. 76 Recipients of these
scholarships may use them at any non-failing public school in their
own district; at a non-failing public school, if seats are open, in an
adjacent school district; 77 or at any participating private school. Thus
far, the Florida Department of Education has certified a very small
7s
number of schools as failing for two years.

Given this program design and testing results, the Florida program sails over Zelman's Establishment Clause hurdle. The premise of
the program is that schools must be tested for adequacy, and that Florida parents whose children attend schools that have twice failed to
meet state standards must be given exit options. But the number of
twice-failing schools is tiny, and parents of children in them may
choose from a broad array of not-failing public schools, perhaps including those in districts other their own, and participating private
schools, not all of which are religious. The schools must accept
voucher students on a random and religion-neutral basis, giving no
weight to the applicant's academic history. On these facts, there can
be little doubt that Zelman's requirements that parental choices of
75 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 229.0537(3) (West Supp. 2003). A county-level court has
recently ruled the program to be a violation of the state constitution. Holmes v. Bush,
No. CV 99-3370, 2002 WL 1809079 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 5, 2002). We discuss Holmes and
the issues it raises in Part II.A.
76 Many details of the Florida program are available at Florida Choice, School
Choice Info, at http://www.schoolchoiceinfo.org (last visited Feb. 5, 2003). The particulars of the state-wide testing system, which focuses on reading, writing, and mathematics, and is administered by the state Department of Education, can be located at

School Grading System, Florida Child, at http://www.floridachild.org/aaschoolgrading.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2003). To fail, a school must fall below pre-set criteria in
all three academic areas. Only seventy-eight schools failed the first set of Florida tests,
and of these, only two failed a second consecutive year. "PuttingPerformanceFirst: Academic Accountability and School Choice" in Florida:HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Oversights
and Investigations of the House Comm. on Education and the Workforce, 106th Cong. (2000)
(statement of Hon. Jim Gallagher, Florida Education Commissioner), at http://
commdocs.house.gov/committees/edu/hedo&i6-100.000/hedo&i6-100. htm#_Toc
482174449 (last visited Feb. 5, 2003).
77 FiA. STAT. ANN. § 229.0537(3) (2) (b), (3)(3)(e).
78 James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The PoliticalEconomy of School Choice, 111 YALE
L.J. 2043, 2079 (2002).

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEWo

[VOL. 78:4

school be "genuine" and "independent," and that parents not be coerced into sending their children to religious schools, are satisfied.
The premise of the Cleveland program is that the entire system of
neighborhood public schools is flawed, and that parents should be
empowered to escape it. Florida's premise is far narrower; some particular schools are failing, and if they cannot improve sufficiently, parents should be able to move their children-and the state's support
associated with those children7 9-to

a school that is not failing.

What if a community with very good public schools decides to
create a voucher program, in which religious schools may participate?
First, we note that this presents a situation in which the political likelihood of a voucher plan being enacted is probably close to zero. Most
excellent public school systems in the United States are in affluent
suburbs, which tend to have the will and the resources to support high
quality public schools. The political motivation that ordinarily fuels
voucher proposals is completely missing from such a jurisdiction; indeed, one would expect opposition from supporters of the public system to be extremely high. Unless challengers can demonstrate that a
voucher program is motivated by a governmental intent to help sectarian schools or religious families, rather than promote competition
among all schools and facilitate religion-neutral parental choice, the
constitutionality of a voucher plan in such a jurisdiction is completely
assured; parents in this hypothetical jurisdiction have ample and rich
secular, public choices. The overriding lesson of Zelman is that every
school option, public and private, is part of the relevant choice menu.
Thus, even if every private option was religious in character, a voucher
plan in such a setting would pass Establishment Clause muster.
Ironically, given the policy impetus for school vouchers, the most
difficult context in which to defend the constitutionality of a voucher
plan involves a jurisdiction with dismal public schools, and no innovation in place either to improve them, or offer new, public alternatives,
as Cleveland had done. In such a community, a plan that involved an
overwhelming majority of religious private schools among the participating private schools would create the maximum incentive-approaching coercion as the public schools deteriorated further-for
parents to select religious schools for their children.
It is not clear from Zelman whether such a program would be
constitutionally acceptable. The Court's opinion does mention the
79

If a child exits a failing school with an opportunity scholarship, the school he

or she leaves behind loses an amount of state budget support equivalent to the
amount of the scholarship. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 229.0537(6).
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neighborhood public schools as being among the relevant options, s '
but it is only one of several, and the facts are sufficiently different
from our hypothetical that one cannot be sure of the outcome,' We
very much doubt, however, whether a voucher program in such an
educationally dismal place will ever come to be. First of all, a system
that bad would be under tremendous political pressure, from within
and without, to improve its public offerings. Second, recent federal
legislation-the No Child Left Behind Act 2-creates financial incentives for states and localities to make precisely the sort of innovations
that Cleveland had employed. In Zelman, those innovations played a
central part in the Court's rationale, and some version of them is
likely to appear everywhere prior to the enactment of a voucher program, which remains in most jurisdictions a political last resort.
b.

The Failure To Justify the Principle of Choice

Clarity and simplicity should be counted among the virtues of the
majority's opinion, but normative justification is hard to find. The
Court identified Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest as controlling precedent,
drew from them "the principle of private choice," 83 and concluded
that the Ohio scholarship scheme qualifies as a program of private
choice, thus ending the constitutional inquiry. Despite repeatedly invoking the mantra of "genuine private choice," the majority never explained why a recipient's intervening choice dissolves the
Establishment Clause concerns that typically attend unrestricted transfers of public funds to religious institutions. Why is indirect aid not
84
just a form of "money laundering," as the dissenters claimed?
Any answer to that question depends on prior understandings
about the meaning and purpose of the Establishment Clause, though
the Zelman opinion is silent about such matters. The majority's lack of
a theoretical foundation for the principle of private choice may be
simply a reflection of the Chief Justice's style, or a reflection of an
uneasy relationship between Justice O'Connor and the four Justices
80 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2469 (2002) ("Cleveland schoolchildren enjoy a range of educational choices: They may remain in public school as
).
before ....
81 The ultimate conclusion on this question may reside in the short run in
whether Justice O'Connor would join in an opinion to uphold such a program. We
have our doubts about that. See infra text accompanying notes 96-135.
82 No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C.A. § 6301 (West 2003).
83 Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2466-67.
84 Id. at 2489-90. The money-laundering image had been invoked before by
Laura Underkuffier, The Individual as Causative Agent in Establishment ClauseJurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 167, 187-90 (2000).
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who joined in the Mitchell v. Helms plurality. For those four, private
choice is unnecessary to establish the constitutionality of the program-secular purpose and formal neutrality do all the work.
Nevertheless, a glimpse at the underlying commitments of the
Zelman majority can be discerned from the Court's treatment of the
precedents for its "principle of private choice." In its discussion of
Mueller, the Court said that private choice "ensure[s] that 'no imprimatur of state approval' can be deemed to have been conferred on
any particular religion, or on religion generally."8 5 Summarizing
Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest, the Court contended that in a program of
indirect aid, "The incidental advancement of a religious mission, or
the perceived endorsement of a religious message, is reasonably attributable to the individual recipient, not to the government, whose role
ends with the disbursement of benefits."8"" The "reasonable observer"
sees the state provide benefits to a broad class of individuals, and then
sees the beneficiaries use the state's funds to receive services from a
range of providers, both religious and nonreligious. For the reasonable observer, according to the majority's analysis, the state's attitude
toward payments to religious providers is one of benign indifference,
not endorsement.
The Court's focus on endorsement-a concept far better suited
to analysis of cases involving religious expression by the governmentcan be attributed at least in part to the attention the parties in Zelman
gave to the concept. Both sides perceived that Justice O'Connor represented the swing vote, and she has long been associated with the
endorsement test.8 7 Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, refrained the
endorsement analysis, and thus the significance of private choice, to
match the plurality's reasoning in Mitchell v. Helms.,, In Mitchell, the
85 Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2466 (quoting Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983)
(quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981))).

86
87

Id. at 2467.
See infra note 97 and accompanying text; see aLso Petitioner's Brief at 15-17,
21-22, 32, 35-38, Zehnan v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 246) (2002) (No. 00-1751);
Petitioner's Reply Brief at 5-7, 13, Zelnan v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002)
(No. 00-1751 ); Brief of Respondent Gatton at 15, 21-22, 40, 43-44, 46-48, Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002) (No. 00-1751 ); Brief of Respondent SimmonsHarris at 10, 37-38 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002) (No. 00-1751).
See generally David Cole, Faith and Funding: 7ward an Fxpressivist Model of the Establishment Clause, 75 S. CAL. L. REv'. 559 (2002) (arguing endorsement analysis should follow from speech cases to funding cases). In our judgment, Zelman represents the
stillbirth of Cole's argument; if reasonable observers will always be deemed to know
that the state is supporting religious and secular organizations evenhandedly, they will
never perceive state endorsement of religion.

88

530 U.S. 793 (2000).
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plurality collapsed Lemon's effects test into the single criterion of
neutrality:
If the religious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike eligible for
government aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination
that any particular recipient conducts has been done at the behest
of the government. For attribution of indoctrination is a relative
question. If the government is offering assistance to recipients who
provide, so to speak, a broad range of indoctrination, the government is not itself thought responsible for any particular indoctrination. To put the point differently, if the government, seeking to
further some legitimate secular purpose, offers aid on the same
terms, without regard to religion, to all who adequately furthered
that purpose, then it is fair to say that any aid going to a religious
recipient only has the effect of furthering that secular purpose. 89'
Thus, for the Mitchell plurality-four of the five Justices in the
Zelman majority-the Establishment Clause is offended when the government acts with the intent to advance some or all religions, or
would be perceived by a reasonable observer to have acted with that
intent. Absent such a finding of intent to advance religion over its
secular counterpart, the state should not be deemed responsible for
any religious indoctrination that accompanies state-financed services
provided by religious entities.
This emphasis on the government's neutrality and intentionality,
rather than on the foreseeable effects of the voucher program in
steering some families in the direction of religious education, is most
visible in the Court's attempt to distinguish the holding of Committee

for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist.VIO The Court referred
to the "ostensibly secular purposes" offered to support the program of
tuition grants and tax credits)11 and focused on the underlying legislative motive for enacting the program, which was determined to be the
"increasingly grave fiscal problems" facing private religious schools. 92"
This impermissible motive was manifest in the "package of benefits"
given "exclusively to private schools and the parents of private school
enrollees." 9 In contrast, the Cleveland voucher plan had emerged
from a long-and religion-neutral-history of public school failure
and the state's enactment of a wide array of programs designed to
89 Id. at 809. Note Justice O'Connor's sharp critique of this account of neutrality.
Id. at 836-37 (O'Connor, j., concurring in the judgment).
90 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
91 Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2472. For a listing of those ostensibly secular purposes,
see Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 773-74.
92 Zehnan, 122 S. Ct. at 2472 (quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 795).
93 Id.
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address that failure. The "history and context" of the Ohio Scholarship Program, of which the reasonable observer is necessarily aware,
should convince anyone that the government acted with religion-neu4
tral intent.9
By collapsing the Establishment Clause inquiry into whether or
not the government acted, or was reasonably perceived to have acted,
with religion-neutral intent, the Court (or more properly, those who
joined the Mitchell plurality) has in fact limited considerably the independent significance of "genuine" choice. The first two criteria of the
Lemon effects test-religion-neutral classification of providers and
beneficiaries, and broad distribution of benefits-provide the necessary scrutiny of the government's bonafides. Any program that meets
those two requirements will likely be perceived as religion-neutral in
its intent.9 5 The beneficiary's private choice simply confirms what was
already established, i.e., that the government should not be deemed
responsible for religious indoctrination that the beneficiary receives
with the voucher-financed services.
This theoretical foundation for the Court's opinion faces one inescapable problem: Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion in
Mitchell, specifically rejected the plurality's attempt to reduce Establishment Clause analysis to the neutral-intent inquiry. 96 Because the
intervening private choice was decisive for Justice O'Connor, and the
majority needed her tojoin in order to maintain a unified Court opinion, the Chief Justice needed to highlight the importance of private
choice. The compromise obviously left Chief Justice Rehnquist in a
difficult position. To articulate an Establishment Clause theory that
really turned on "genuine and independent choice," he would need
to limit significantly the neutral-intent analysis advanced in Mitchell,
and perhaps risk losing the votes of other members of the majority. If
he ignored or downplayed the criteria of private choice, the ChiefJustice would risk losingJustice O'Connor from the majority. The resulting majority opinion demonstrates the Chief Justice's balancing act:
the concept of "genuine and independent choice" takes center stage,
but in no way limits the Mitchell plurality's approach to the Establishment Clause. In cases of direct funding, just as in arrangements involving private choice, these four Justices-Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas-will remain willing to up94 Id. at 2469 (citing Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119
(2001)).
95 Indeed, the phtrality in Mitchell found that the program at issue in that case
reflected "independent and private choice." Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 814-20

(2000).
96

1d. at 836-43 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the Judgment).
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hold aid programs so long as government does not intend to prefer
religious institutions to nonreligious institutions.
2. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
From the time the Court granted certiorari in Zelman, observers
generally agreed thatJustice O'Connor's vote would be decisive in the
case. 97 Parties and amici wrote briefs designed to attract her attention, typically focusing their arguments on the endorsement test that
O'Connor first articulated, and to which she frequently returns in Establishment Clause cases."" Once the Court announced its decision,
most commentators focused not on what O'Connor said, but what she
did not say or do. Unlike in Mitchell, O'Connor's concurrence in
Zelman seems to impose no constraints on the Court's decision. 99 A
closer reading, however, reveals subtle differences between her concurrence and the majority opinion, differences that could prove significant for the future of indirect-aid cases.
Justice O'Connor's opinion starts with a wide-ranging survey of
government programs that provide indirect, unrestricted support for
religious institutions.""' Her ostensible purpose for this inquiry is to
show that "the support that the Cleveland voucher program provides
religious institutions is neither substantial nor atypical of existing government programs."""' The effect of this long catalogue is even
broader; it shows that the dissenters' account of no-aid separationism
has always been a chimera in practice, and is now a dinosaur in
theory.
The second and third parts of her opinion prove to be the more
significant. At first glance, Justice O'Connor seems to have simply restated the Court's analysis. She emphasized Zelman's continuity with
97 See, e.g, Michael A. Fletcher, High CourtJoins Battle Over School Vouchers: ChurchState Divide at Issue in Ohio Case, WASH. PosT, Feb. 20, 2002, at A6; Linda Greenhouse,
Cleveland's School Vouchers Weighed by Suptreme Court, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 21, 2002, at Al;
Linda Greenhouse, Court Takes Case Testing the Limits of Voucher Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
26, 2001, at A1; Charles Lane, The O'Connor Factor:Justice Plays Pivotal Role on High
Court, WASH. Posr, Feb. 18, 2002, at Al.
98 Petitioner's Brief at 15-17, 21-22, 32, 35-38, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S.
Ct. 2460 (2002) (No. 00-1751); Petitioner's Reply Brief at 5-7, 13, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002) (No. 00-1751); see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor,J., concurring) (introducing endorsement test into the
law of the Establishment Clause); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997)

(applying endorsement test).
99 We took this view in our initial reaction to the Court's decision. Ira C. Lupu &
Robert W. Tuttle, In Vouchers We Trust, LEGAL TiMES, July 8, 2002, at 34.
100 Zebnan, 122 S. Ct. at 2474-75 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

101

Id. at 2475 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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earlier Establishment Clause decisions; the significance of "genuine
choice"; 1" 2 the need to consider "all the choices available to potential
beneficiaries";11 3 and the placement upon challengers to a voucher
program of the evidentiary burden to show the lack of a "genuine
choice."' 1

4

In

several

important

respects,

however,

Justice

O'Connor's restatement of the Court's analysis reveals important differences between her understanding of the Establishment Clause and
that shared by the other four members of the Zelman majority.
The first such difference emerges in her response to Justice Souter's claim that the Ohio Scholarship Program failed to provide Cleveland parents with reasonable "secular alternatives."' 11 5 Justice
O'Connor replied: "For nonreligious schools to qualify as genuine options for parents, they need not be superior to religious schools in
every respect. They need only be adequate substitutes for religious
schools in the eyes of parents."' 1 6 This test seems both disingenuous
and superficial. No one had ever claimed that nonreligious schools
"need ...

[to] be superior to religious schools in every respect"; and

the consumer choice model of reasonable alternatives appears to be
no more than a truism-because parents send their children to a
school, they must find it a reasonable alternative. In her discussion of
the test, however, Justice O'Connor demonstrated her uneasiness with
the Court's formality. Where the Court met the dissents' objections
by reciting case law and the structure of Ohio's programs, Justice
O'Connor shifted attention to the parents of Cleveland schoolchildren and their experience of school choice. Against Justice Souter's
claim that few of the community schools should count as "reasonable
alternatives" because of low test scores, Justice O'Connor pointed to
the high levels of parental satisfaction at those schools, the possibility
that parents may be attracted not just by test scores but by discipline
and safety for their children, and the fact that the community schools
in question served among the "poorest and most educationally disadvantaged students."" 7
The shift in focus is also evident as Justice O'Connor turned to
the majority's placement of the evidentiary burden and explained
how the presumption of genuine choice can be overcome: "there is
102
103
104
105

106
107

Id. at 2478 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. (O'Connor, j., concurring).
[d. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
id. at 2492 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 2477 (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
Id. at 2479 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting lay P. Greene et al., Lessons

from the Cleveland Scholarship Program 22, 24 (Oct. 15, 1997),
www.ksg.harvard.ed/pepg/pdf/lessclev.pdf).

available at http://
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no record evidence that any voucher-eligible student was turned away
from a nonreligious private school in the voucher program, let alone
a community or magnet school.""'8 Contrast this statement of the
burden of persuasion with that of the Court. The Court found that
the challengers provided "no evidence that the State deliberately
skewed incentives toward religious schools."''
The Zelman majority
would seem to find a violation only on proof that the state intended to
steer children into religious education, but Justice O'Connor measured the effect of the program on Cleveland parents and schoolchildren, and asked whether secular options were in fact open or closed
to voucher recipients.
An even more subtle distinction further demonstrates Justice
O'Connor's divergence from the other members of the Zelman majority. Restating the Court's test for "genuine and independent choice,"
Justice O'Connor said that the criteria "require[ ] that state aid flowing to religious organizations through the hands of beneficiaries must
do so only at the direction of those beneficiaries."''"I Most of the statement parallels the Court's mantra of "true private choice," except for
the specification that the aid must flow "through the hands of beneficiaries." Though unimportant for the decision in Zelman-because
the tuition vouchers were made payable to parents, who then endorsed the checks over to the schools-this distinction was part of
what separated Justice O'Connor from the plurality in Mitchell. The
plurality identified the program at issue in Mitchell as one of "virtual"
private choice because schools received the government support on a
per capita basis-the amount of government aid was determined by
the number of students enrolled at each school. I l
Justice O'Connor, however, drew a sharp distinction between the
"true private choice" programs at issue in Witters and Zobrest, and the
per capita aid program considered in Mitchell.112 In Mitchell,Justice
O'Connor offered three justifications for her refusal to equate per
capita aid programs with those involving "true private choice." First,
she claimed that per capita aid programs are more likely to be perceived as governmental "endorsements" of the institutions receiving
aid. The claim, however, proves nothing more than an assertion:
"[t] he [per capita] aid formula does not-and could not-indicate to
108 Id. at 2477 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
109 1d. at 2466.
110 Id. at 2476 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
III Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 810-11 (2000).
112 Id. at 843 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). For a recent attempt to
grapple with the distinction between per capita and beneficiary choice programs, see
Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2002).
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a reasonable observer that the inculcation of religion is endorsed only
The statement
by the individuals attending the religious school."' '
reveals more about the elasticity of the endorsement test than it does
about the program in question. Why would a reasonable observer not
perceive that the state's aid is wholly dependent on actual student enrollment in the school, and thus is disconnected from any independent (and presumably illegitimate) intention of the state to finance
the religious aspects of the school?
Second, Justice O'Connor argued that collapsing private choice
and per capita aid programs-especially those involving cash transfers-leads to a slippery slope, potentially ending in "direct money
payments to religious organizations (including churches) based on
the number of persons belonging to each organization." '" 4 Although
the Mitchell plurality's analysis could be construed to justify such
grants to religious organizations, it is hard to see how the distinction
between "true" and "virtual" private choice programs is material to
this slippery slope. What difference would it make if government aid
for religious organizations was distributed in the form of vouchers
paid to individuals, who could then redeem the vouchers at the religious institution of their choice? Whether it used "true" or "virtual"
private choice, the government would still need to establish a legitimate secular purpose for the aid, and show that the aid was distributed through religion-neutral categories. The fact that aid passed
"through the hands of beneficiaries"' 15 seems hardly relevant to
whether the state could finance the specifically religious activities of
religious organizations.
The only plausible justification is found in Justice O'Connor's
third ground for distinguishing per capita aid from private choice
programs:
[W] hen the government provides aid directly to the student beneficiary, that student can attend a religious school and yet retain control over whether the secular government aid will be applied toward
the religious education. The fact that aid flows to the religious
school and is used for the advancement of religion is therefore
wholly dependent on the student's private decision.' I
Control is demonstrated by the beneficiary's freedom to attend
the school and yet refuse the state's payment for her education; per
i13 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 843 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
114 Id. at 843-44 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
115 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2476 (2002) (O'Connor,
concurring).
116 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 842 (O'ConnorJ, concurring in judgment).
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capita aid programs deprive the beneficiary of that control. Justice
O'Connor's emphasis on the beneficiary's power to refuse the transfer
of government funds to a chosen service provider can be traced back
to an analogy first introduced in Witters. Writing for the Court, Justice
Marshall said "a State may issue a paycheck to one of its employees,
who may then donate all or part of that paycheck to a religious institution, all without constitutional barrier; and the State may do so even
knowing that the employee so intends to dispose of his salary."' 1 7 The
paradigmatic case of the donated paycheck offers several analytically
important features. The government transfers ownership of the
money to the beneficiary, and retains only those controls over its use
that apply to anyone's use of money-e.g., criminal prohibitions on
the purchase of illegal drugs. The transfer is made in cash, leaving
the beneficiary with a virtually unlimited realm of options for spending or saving the money. In short, the government employee enjoys
control over the money and its disposition, and it is this experience of
control that Justice O'Connor's analysis tries to capture.
The emphasis on the beneficiary's experience of control relates
directly to the other points at which Justice O'Connor diverged from
the Court's opinion in Zelman. At nearly every important juncture in
the Court's analysis-from the definition of the standard for "genuine
choice" to the tests for "reasonable secular alternatives" and the evidentiary burden on challengers-Justice O'Connor directs attention
to the actual experiences of parents in the Cleveland voucher prograin, while the Court maintains a detached and formalist focus on
the structure of the state's program. ForJustice O'Connor, a program
of "genuine and independent private choice" depends on the experienced and practical-not hypothetical-freedom of beneficiaries to
select between religious and nonreligious providers. Such freedom
ensures that beneficiaries have not been intentionally directed by the
state into religious education, which is the primary concern in the
Court's analysis, and it guarantees as well that they have not been
channeled into religious education because of administrative indifference, or because of a set of options that precludes a realistic choice of
a secular provider.
This interpretation of the contrast between the Court's decision
and Justice O'Connor's concurrence leads us to conclude that Justice
O'Connor is the only member of the Court who thinks that "genuine
and independent choice" has determinative constitutional signifi117

Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. fbr the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 486-87 (1986), cited

in Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 841 (O'ConnorJ., conctrring in the judgment). Interestingly,
the analogy comes in a portion of Witters that Justice O'Connor did not join.
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cance. The four dissentingJustices largely reject the concept of recipient choice, believing it to be a matter of form and not substance, and
continue to assert no-aid Separationism. 1 18 The four members of the
Mitchell plurality subsume beneficiary choice under the general idea
of religion-neutrality; for these Justices, beneficiary choice provides evidence of the government's proper intention, but has no independent
significance. '' Nevertheless, the Zelman decision has enshrined the
concept of "true private choice" in the law of the Establishment
Clause, though neither the Court's opinion nor Justice O'Connor's
2
provides adequate justification for the concept. 1
We think that Justice O'Connor's attention to the beneficiary's
experience of choice represents the correct focus for constitutional
analysis of voucher programs, and provides a key to the principled
justification of beneficiary choice. Her demand that aid must pass
"through the hands of beneficiaries,"'1' however, proves to be an awkward proxy for advancing that concern. A sounder approach requires
that we step back and examine the core vices with which the Establishment Clause is concerned.
The regime of strong Separationism offered its own account of
those vices, but that account no longer carries the persuasive force
that it once did.' 2 2 First, despite Separationist claims to the contrary,
the Establishment Clause does not protect against violations of taxpayer conscience caused by government support for religious institutions. 12 " Justice O'Connor's long catalogue of government support
for religion makes clear the extent to which such support is a normal
118 Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2486-90 (Souter, J., dissenting).
119 Id. at 2466-70.
120 With respect to the majority's opinion, the failure to justify the centrality of
beneficiay choice is easy to explain. As we disctIss above, ChiefJtstice Rehnquist
likely used the phrase to ensure a majority decision, but had no incentive to develop
the concept in any way that would limit the concept of "absolute neutrality" advanced
by the plurality opinion in Mitchell. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 838 (O'Connor, J., conchrring in the judgment) (describing the plurality's treatment of neutrality as "nearabsolute").
121
Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2476 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
122 We analyze the Separationist account and its decline in Lupu & Tuttle, s'upra
note 39, at 51-72, and in Ira C. [,upu & Robert W. Tuttle, Historic Preservation Grants to
Houses of Worship: A Case Study in the Survival of Sep1arationism, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1139,

1142-52 (2002).
123

Of the fifty state constitutions, each of which contains some version of nonest-

ablishment norms, only the Vermont provision is framed in terms of taxpayer conscience. See Vr. CONST. art. 3. We collect the texts of the relevant nonestablishnent

provisions of the fifty states in Ira C. Itupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Government Partnerships
with Faith-Based Service Providers: State of the Law 77-129 (Dec. I1, 2002), at http://
www.religionanclsocialpolicy.org.
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part of contemporary and historical practice. In addition, there is no
principled reason why the consciences of taxpayers with respect to religious matters should enjoy constitutional preference over the consciences of taxpayers with respect to nonreligious matters, such as
support for weapons, sex education, or art. Second, the Establishment Clause does not protect religious institutions from becoming
slothful through dependence on government support. 124 Why should
the indolence or energy of religious institutions be a legitimate matter
for government concern-or, at least, any more a matter of concern
than the indolence of nonreligious voluntary associations? Third, at
least in its focus upon government expenditures, the Establishment
125
Clause does not act primarily as a safeguard against religious strife.
Despite the extensive pattern of support documented by Justice
O'Connor, such strife has not been a significant part of our history,
and certainly has beei overshadowed by other sources of conflict.
The Establishment Clause, however, does guard against a core
vice-the government's assertion of control over, or competence in,
matters of religion. Cases involving government-sponsored religious
expression provide clear examples of this vice, and the Court has continued to hold unconstitutional such acts of expression.' 12 Direct financing of religious activity also represents a clear example of the
vice, partly because of the government's advancement of religious
ends, and partly because of the government control that inevitably
accompanies such financing. 127
Moreover, the ambit of the Establishment Clause extends beyond
the government's direct and intentional engagement in religious activities. Since Abington School District v. Schemmp,' 28 a case involving
Bible reading in public schools, the Court has asked whether a chal124 This reason appears in James Madison's Memorial & Remonstrance.

JAMES

MADISON, A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), in 8 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON

298, 30) (Robert A. Rutland et al eds., 1973). Justice Rut-

ledge sets out the Memorial & Remonstrance in the Appendix to his dissenting opinion
in Everson v. Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Madison
may have borrowed the idea from ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS
216-18 (Knud Haatsonssen ed., 2002) (1759).
125 We discuss this theme in connection with the dissent ofJustice Breyer. See infra
Part l.B.4.b.
126 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding unconstitutional school-sponsored, student-led prayer before football games); Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding unconstitutional nonsectarian benediction at a public
school graduation).
127 For further discussion of this point in the context of historic preservation, see
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 122, at 1174.
128 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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lenged program had the "primary effect"' 2 9 of advancing or inhibiting
religion, not just whether government intended to advance or inhibit
religion. The question of forbidden effects has remained at the forefront of Establishment Clause jurisprudence ever since the Schemmp
case, and the Zelman Court acknowledges the centrality of this concern, even as it focuses almost exclusively on the neutrality of Ohio's
intent in structuring the voucher program.'
At its most basic, the
analysis of primary effects measures the "obvious and foreseeable religious consequences of state policy," and in particular "the effects on
the targets or recipients" of government programs or actions.l"" Seen
in this light, judicial examination of effects proceeds from a rather
ordinary legal principle: one can be held responsible for certain foreseeable consequences of one's actions, whether or not the conse2
quences were intended. 1'1
The chief difficulty lies in determining the
circumstances under which one should be held responsible.
Justice O'Connor's analysis in Zelman shows some degree of
awareness of the unintended but foreseeable consequences of the
Ohio Scholarship Program. Her attention to the actual experiences
of parents and schoolchildren under the program demonstrates a
concern that children enrolled in religious schools are there because
of the "genuine and independent choices" of their parents, not because of pressures for which the state should be held responsible. Justice O'Connor's focus on whether or not the money passes through
the beneficiary's hands, however, offers little protection for her chief
worry. It would be easy to design a program that used the same financing mechanism as Cleveland's-that is, the check goes first to the
parent and is then endorsed over to the school-but offered fewer
and less attractive secular alternatives. The financing mechanism
alone might turn out to be nothing other than what the dissent believes it to be, pure form without substance. We believe that Justice
O'Connor's concerns would have been better served if she had articulated them more directly, and adopted a test of "genuine choice" that
measured whether or not the state was, in fact, exerting practical pressures on Cleveland parents to send their children to religious schools.
129
I. at 222.
130 For a more sustained analysis of the "primary effects" test, see Lupu & Tuttle,
supra note 9, at 557-59.
131 Id. at 559.
132 This concern about the state's responsibility tbr unintended but foreseeable
consequences of its actions is already a part of Establishment Clause law. See Agostini
v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 223-24 (1997) (asserting that, in Establishment Clause cases,
courts must decide whether government is responsible for religious indoctrination).

For elaboration on this theme, see Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 9, at 556-59.
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In an earlier article,1 3 3 we suggested just such a test, one that focused on the extent to which the state steered families toward religious experience, and the extent to which the state made efforts to
ameliorate pressures in that direction. Rather than focus on the actual mix of religious and secular schools, which initially would be
heavily influenced by the pre-existing demographics of private education, we urged that courts impose an affirmative duty on the state to
take steps to improve the mix. 13 4 In particular, we suggested that the
Ohio voucher program could have required suburban public school
systems to admit voucher students, mandated that participating religious schools permit voucher students to opt out of worship and religious education classes, and increased the voucher amount to attract
additional private schools into the program-measures successfully
used in other voucher jurisdictions. 3 5 We do not claim that our approach is the only one responsive to the possibility of state-created
incentives to undertake religious training. Justice O'Connor's opinion would have been much stronger, however, had she made explicit
the need for an inquiry into such incentives.
3.

Justice Thomas's Concurrence

Like Justice O'Connor, Justice Thomas joined the Court opinion
but wrote separately and alone as well. His concurrence-highlighted
two major themes. First, he began and ended by emphasizing the
137
36
connection between Brown v. Board of Education' and Zelman.
Brown had promised equal educational opportunity for racial minority
children in America, but the ghettoization of many of these children
in large urban centers where public schools have deteriorated has undermined this promise.' 38 Justice Thomas reminded us quite eloquently of the ways in which school voucher plans, once thought to be
133
134

Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 9.
In our analysis, the precise nature of the state's affirmative duty would vary

relative to the extent to which the state required beneficiaries to avail themselves of a
particular service (e.g., compulsory school attendance laws for minors or court-mandated substance abuse treatment) and the extent to which the state intended the
service to comprehensively transform the beneficiary. See id. at 594-98.
135 Id. at 598-601. The Milwaukee voucher program represents the best example
of such measures. SeeJackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998).
136

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

137

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,

122 S.

Ct. 2460,

2480-81,

2483-84

(2002)

(Thomas, J., concurring).
138 Ryan & Heise, supra note 78, at 2093-96; see alsoJoseph P. Viteritti, Reachingfor
Equality: The Salience of School Choice, 14J.L. & POL. 468, 468-75 (1998).
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potential engines of "white flight," might help redeem the commitments made fifty years ago in Brown.
Second, Justice Thomas provocatively suggested that the Court's
decision in Everson v. Board of Education,'I' which declared the Estab-

4
lishment Clause applicable to the states, should be reconsidered.1 1
Justice Black's opinion for the Court in Everson announced .this proposition without any careful inquiry, 14 and none of the otherJustices
writing in Everson challenged him. Ever since, the Supreme Court has
treated the question as entirely settled.142 Several commentators have
strenuously questioned this conclusion as a historical and textual matter, 143 however, and Justice Thomas-consistent with his willingness
to re-examine first principles144-urged that the Court limit its intervention into religious liberty issues arising under state law to those
45
properly cognizable under the Free Exercise Clause.'

139 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
140 Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2480-82 (Thomas, J., concurring).
141 To be fair toJustice Black, we note here that the defendants in Everson did not
question the proposition that the states and localities were bound by principles of
church-state separation. Pi-iLii' HAMBUR(;ER, THiE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
459 (2002).
Professor Hamburger argues, however, thatJustice Black would have been deeply
unreceptive to such arguments. See id. at 454-63. And, of course, Justice Black had
always maintained that the entire Bill of Rights applied to the states by virtue of incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
142 1i ]jafi'ee v. Board of School Commissioners, DistrictJudge Brevard Hand ruled that
the Establishment Clause does not bind the states. 554 F. Supp. 1104, 1119-29 (S.D.
Ala. 1983), rev'd sub. nora. Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). The Supreme Court
overruled Hand's decision; Justice Stevens's opinion for the majority chastises Judge
Hand for the district court's ruling. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 48-55.
143 In his concurrence, Justice Thomas cited William K. Lietzatu, Rediscoveing the
Establishment Clause:Federalism and the Rollback of [ncoqroration,39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191,
1192-94 (1990) (arguing for a return to the original understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment that would not incorporate the Bill of Rights against the states), and
Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L:J. 1131, 1157-60
(1991) (arguing that the Establishment Clause was designed in part to protect the
states against a Congressionally forced disestablishment of state religions, and therefore should not have been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment and applied to the states).
144 See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 528 (1999) (Thomas,J., concurring) (urging a reevaluation of "what the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought that
[the Privileges or Immunities Clause] meant"); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (urging construction of a Commerce Clause
standard "that reflects the text and history of the ... Clause").
145 Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2482 (ThomasJ., concurring).
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This is not the place for us to confront head-on this challenge to
a half-century's understanding of the place of the Establishment
Clause in American constitutional law.' 46 We note, however, thatJustice Thomas's suggestion that states be left free to work out their own
church-state policy interacts in significant ways with the role of state
constitutional law in post-Zelman litigation. Justice Thomas hints that
free exercise values, but not pure non-Establishment values, indeed
limit the states, and the scope and content of that distinction may turn
out to be of considerable significance. We will take up that discussion
in further detail in Part II.A, below.
4.

The Dissents
a. Justice Souter's Dissent

Justice Souter has for years been the Court's most active Separationist,' 4 7 and his Zelman opinion is consistent with that reputation.
The longest of all the Zelman opinions, 148 it begins with a dramatic
assertion that Zelman has effectively dismantled Everson, 149 the Court's
germinal Establishment Clause decision. The dissent then proceeds
in three sections. Section I traces and attempts to synthesize all of the
Court's decisions about aid to religious entities since Everson.150 From
this review, Section I concludes that the Zelman opinion marks the
first time that the Court has ever (1) deemed irrelevant "the substantiality of the aid,"' 5 1 or (2) "held purely formal criteria to suffice for
146 Whatever the text and original history reveal, equal protection and free exercise concerns all buttress the application of Establishment Clause values to the states.
See Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise Clause: Religious Exemption Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1106, 1149-56 (1994); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructingthe Establishment Clause: The Case Against DiscretionaryAccommodation of Religion,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 576-80 (1991).
147 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 559-80
(1993) (Souter,.J., concurring) (urging overruling of Employment Division v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990)); see aLso Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 867-913 (2000) (SouterJ.,
dissenting); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 863-99
(1995) (Souter, J., dissenting); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1,
14-24 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Justice Souter).
148 Justice Souter's dissent is thirty-four pages in the slip opinions, compared to
twenty-one for the Court, fifteen for Justice O'Connor, ten forJustice Thomas, thirteen for Justice Breyer, and three forJustice Stevens.
149 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In a five-to-four decision, Everson
upheld a program of subsidy for transporting children to religious and public schools,
but all nine Justices proclaimed a strong Separationist position on aid to sectarian
schools.
150 Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2486-90 (Souter, J., dissenting).
151 Id. at 2490 (SouterJ., dissenting).
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scrutinizing aid that ends up in the coffers of religious schools."' 5 2
Section II argues that the Cleveland voucher program does not satisfy
the Court's own criteria of neutrality and private choice, because, in
Justice Souter's view, the relevant baseline for measuring both neutrality and private choice is the set of participating private schools, most
of which are religious, rather than the broader universe of all educational options open to Cleveland parents.15 3 Finally, Section III argues that even if the program were neutral and rested on
independent private choice, it would still represent substantial aid to
the religious teaching function of sectarian schools and therefore violate the Establishment Clause.'15 4 Here, the opinion emphasizes the
threat that government largesse of any kind may present to the independence of a school's religious mission, 55 and the hazards of political divisiveness on sectarian lines.' 5"
The most complimentary thing we can say aboutJustice Souter's
dissent is that the opinion is true to his longstanding convictions.
Those convictions, however, stand in need of normative defense.
Only if the reasons for barring the state from aiding religious instruction are persuasive, and only if those reasons apply to a private choice
program, is Justice Souter's position fully defensible. Had the Ohio
program involved direct aid to religious schools, without any requirement that public funds be spent only on secular instruction, we would
find a number ofJustice Souter's arguments quite appealing. The key
question presented by Zelman, however, is whether a regime of private
choice should alter the constitutional calculus.' 57 In Section III, Justice Souter rejected the idea that private choice, however structured
or facilitated, can save the Cleveland program; indeed, at the end of
Section II, he conceded that a program of more substantial tuition
grants, which would have widened choice, would only exacerbate the

152 Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
153 Id. at 2490-97 (Souter, J., dissenting):
154 Id.at 2497-502 (SouIter, J., dissenting).
155
i.at 2498-501 (Souter, J., dissenting).
156 Id. at 2501-02 (Souter, j., dissenting). These are elaborated in more detail by
Justice Breyer. See infra Part I.B.4.b.
157 We argued that private choice indeed should rechannel constitutional thinking, see Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 9, but we analyzed the state's role in structuring
that choice far more demandingly than did the Zelman Court, id. at 594-604, and we
concluded that the Cleveland program impermissibly steered Cleveland students into
religious experience. Id. at 604-05. Among scholars, we are the only ones of whom
we are aware who defended a choice-focused paradigm but did not defend the constitutionality of the Cleveland voucher arrangements.
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state aid for the reproblem with which he is concerned-substantial
15
ligious teaching function of sectarian schools.
With respect to a direct-aid program, the case for prohibiting
state subsidy of religious instruction must be rethought. As we argue
above in our discussion of Justice O'Connor's opinion, the case does
not rest on protecting the conscience of taxpayers, who might be compelled to support a wide range of views from which they dissent. Nor
does the case rest on the need to ensure that religious institutions
remain independent of the state. In a complex and advanced society,
such entities will inevitably be deeply dependent on government-for
police and fire protection, for roads that will permit worshipers to attend prayer services, and for direct financial support of their charities
that perform secularly valuable work, 159 among other things.
The best argument for excluding the state from direct support of
religious activity is the importance of keeping the government out of
the realm of the ultimate. The state may of course adopt secular positions, and promote them, but it may not adopt an official view of religious truth. Moreover, if the state pays directly for the transmission of
religious ideals for instrumental reasons of shaping them-say, to encourage a certain view of public morality-it will have incentives to be
selective in the faiths it supports and to exercise control over such
teaching. This will put the state in the constitutionally impermissible
position of choosing and authoring religious faith. Our Constitution's prohibition on religious establishment, and protection of religious liberty, are designed to limit the state to a secular jurisdiction,
and to keep the experience of faith in wholly private hands. At bottom, this arrangement is profoundly anti-totalitarian; it reminds state
officials as well as the citizenry that the state is temporal and limited,
' 60
and should not use faith "as an engine of civil policy.'
Whether this particular justification-to us, the only persuasive
one-can be extended to "private choice" arrangements is the very
question put to the Court by the problem in Zelman. Justice Souter,
and the dissenters who join him, seem to us mired in now-antiquated
and unpersuasive theories of church-state separation.'"' As a result,
158 Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2496-502 (Souter, J., dissenting).
159 Id. at 2474-75 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
160 MADISON, supra note 124, at 29, 32. For elaboration of this point, see Vincent
Blasi, School Vouchers and Religious Liberty: Seven Questionsfrom Madison's Memorial and
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161 Arguments that seemed sufficient to a generation of Justices determined to
keep Catholic schools from attracting a share of public largesse will not seem persuasive to the next generation of American citizens. See generally Ira C. Lupu, The Increasingly Anachronistic Case Against School Vouchers, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETIHICS & PUB.
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they were simply unwilling to confront the premises that led Justice
O'Connor-alone among the Justices, thus far, and unable to articulate fully a normative explanation of her view-to distinguish sharply
in her jurisprudence of non-establishment between direct and indirect aid.
Unable to answerJustice O'Connor and the remainder of the majority on its terms, Justice Souter and his fellow dissenters were content to parrot the arguments of voucher challengers on the nonneutrality of the Cleveland program. Had the dissenters been willing
to take the Court's own premises at face value-in particular, the argument that the public schooling options had to count in any appraisal of whether the state was responsible for religious
indoctrination of voucher students-they might have had a chance of
persuading Justice O'Connor, the crucial fifth vote, to their side. If
they had argued on her terms, rather than their own, they might have
persuaded her that Ohio had not done enough to avoid steering
Cleveland schoolchildren into religious experience as the price of escape from the inadequacies of the public system. Instead, their approach, like that of the challengers, doomed their project to failureand, we expect, ultimate disappearance from the constitutional canon-from the start.
6
b. Justice Breyer's Dissent' 2

Justice Souter's dissent mentioned one additional major argument from Separationism's heyday-that substantial state assistance to
religious schools would lead to social and political strife. It remained,
however, to Justice Breyer to elaborate on this argument in ways that
have not been seen in thirty years.
The argument that state aid to religious schools would foment
political strife along sectarian lines had very brief prominence in the
decisional law dealing with state aid to religious entities. In Lemon v.
Kurtzman'

and, again, two years later in Committeefor Public Education

v. Nyquist,'11 4 Supreme Court majorities relied on this as one of the
POL'Y 375, 385-92 (1999) (arguing that the evolution of attitudes about Roman Catholicisn and the changing demography of private religious schools have Undercut
the Separationist project).
162 We do not offer any separate discussion of Justice Stevens's dissent, which he
wrote for himself only. Suffice it to say that Justice Stevens continued his long and
unbroken record of opposing the cause of religion no inatter what the issues
presented. For firther disctIssion of Stevens's record in this regard, see LuIpu &
Tuttle, supra note 39, at 48 n.48.
163 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
164 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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arguments against the constitutionality of programs that tended heavily to aid Catholic schools. With an eye on contemporary Northern
Ireland, and on European and American history of Protestant-Catholic conflict, the Court in both cases cited the potential for such conflict as a reason to disfavor programs calling for annual appropriations
to a large group of private schools, most of which were Catholic.
Except for cases involving government religious speech, however,
this theme has been heavily criticized and submerged for the past
thirty years of constitutional adjudication. The reasons for this submergence are not difficult to discern. Roe v. Wade1' 5-decided in the
same Term as Nyquist-quickly prompted the Justices to realize that a
great many political issues, not limited to aid to religious schools,
might foment division on sectarian lines. This sort of division also
appears with respect to government policy on sexuality, reproduction,
welfare, capital punishment, and war, to mention but a few. A doctrine that impeded the enactment of policy because of sectarian disagreement has no logical stopping place, and would effectively disable
government from responding to matters of profound moral
significance.
The one context in which the concern for divisiveness has kept. a
small toehold is that of government speech on religious issues. If, for
example, public schools sponsor worship services of any kind, some
political process must be employed to determine their content. Inevitably, such processes, whether they be matters of administration for
elected school boards,166 discretionary decisions by school administrators, 167 or policy determinations officially delegated to students,168
will result in worship choices made by some and imposed coercively
on others. In these circumstances, the prospect of political fights over
the content of prayer echoes historical concerns over state selection of
6
articles of faith. '

9

Whatever the contemporary persuasiveness of these arguments in
the context of government speech, however, they do not carry over
165 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
166 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992) (finding that school principals
were improperly permitted by the school board to promote religion by allowing members of the clergy to speak at graduation).
167 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294, 301 (2000) (finding
prayer led by student chaplain unconstitutional).
168 Id. (finding the same prayer unconstitutional even when the majority of the
student body voted to maintain the policy).
169 See TiiOMASJ. CURRY, THE FiRsT FREEDOMS: CHURCH & STArE IN AMERICA TO
THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 118-33, 172-92 (1986) (discussing conflict
over governmentally imposed articles of faith).
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well to the context of government transfers to religious entities. The
concept of neutrality, as Zelman advances it, is the key to this distinction. Government cannot possibly be evenhanded among prayers or
religious observances; there is never time enough to worship in all
possible ways, and it is impossible to imagine public schools in today's
United States sponsoring daily prayers to Allah, or arranging cafeteria
protocols to fit the laws of Kashrut. By contrast, school voucher plans
must be neutral among faiths. All accredited schools, whether they
are Jewish, Buddhist, Muslim, Christian, secular humanist, or otherwise, must be offered equal opportunity to participate in voucher
programs.
Justice Breyer's dissent shows deep insensitivity to the history, limits, and. failings of the concern for "political divisiveness." He recites a
history of Protestant-Catholic tension in the United States that, if anything, should embarrass a Court that spawned the regime of no-aid
Separationism out of deeply anti-Catholic premises. 70 He worries
about attempts to suppress Islamic teaching or other unpopular views
in voucher schools, 17 1 apparently without realizing the extent to
which this echoes nineteenth and twentieth century concerns about
public subsidy for Catholic schools teaching their students that Protestants were damned. He asserts paternalistic concerns about faiths unable or unwilling to mount schools of their own, and faiths likely to be
172
the object of persecution by public authorities.
This horrible and speculative parade, once the staple of churchstate opinions, now seems hopelessly overbroad and rather out of
touch with American political and cultural realities. If state interference with religious teaching in fact accompanies voucher programs,
we think the Constitution is adequate to the task of blocking that interference. 17 Despite the three votes it got in Zelman, we think the
prophylactic exclusion of religious entities from government support
that Justice Breyer's dissent would require is a relic of a happily lost
constitutional world. Indeed, we think Justice Breyer's view is a cause,
not a cure, of social strife. The religious wars in the United States in
170 At two places in his opinion, Justice Breyer cites HAMBURGER, supra note 141,
for references to Protestant-Catholic conflict over school financing. Zelman v. Simmons Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2504 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer
seems unaware of the general thrust of Professor Hamburger's argument, which is
that Separationist principles, including those from Everson and its progeny, may only
have aggravated the very conflict thatJustice Breyer's Separationist principles purport
to avoid.
171 Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2501, 2506-07.
172 Id. at 2504-07.
173 See infra Part I1.B.
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the early twenty-first century are not Protestant vs. Catholic, or Christian vs. Jew, or even the more plausible Islam vs. all others. They are
instead the wars of the deeply religious against the forces of a relentlessly secular commercial culture. 74 A doctrine that would permit the
state to support secular, but not religious, private schools is likely to
aggravate precisely the sort of conflict with which Justice Breyer, and
those who joined him, purport to be concerned.
II.

THE LEGAL, HORIZON FOR VOUCHER FINANCING OF
RELIGIOUS PROVIDERS

Unlike those landmark court decisions that terminate a government practice-de jure racial segregation, or the criminalization of
abortion, for example- Zelman is merely permissive. It removes
rather than creates a constitutional impediment to state policy. As
such, its significance in American life will turn very heavily on the political energies and legal phenomena which emerge in its wake.
Others have analyzed in considerable detail the strong and determined forces that contend over the future of American education, on
issues of vouchers and otherwise. 17 5 These forces include, on the antivoucher side, suburbanites determined to insulate their public school
systems from poorer urbanites;

76

177
public school teacher unions;

secular liberals committed to preserving the identity-shaping mission
of the common school; 178 and others who fear that voucher programs
will drain resources from public schools. These groups are opposed
174

See generallyJAMES

DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE To DEFINE

(1991) (arguing that the United States has moved from a society characterized by a division among religions, to a society characterized by a division between
religious and non-religious).
175 In a very important recent commentary, Jim Ryan and Michael Heise have analyzed these forces across the range of issues concerning school choice. Ryan & Heise,
supra note 78; see also MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NoT" RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE
PUBLIC GOOD (2002) (discussing the shifting relationships between government and
private, religious, and nonprofit organizations).
176 See Ryan & Heise, supra note 78, at 2045-88.
177 Id. These unions financed the anti-voucher litigation in Zelman, and shaped
the way in which the litigation proceeded. Id. They were central actors in the litigation over the Milwaukee voucher program, upheld in Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d
602 (Wis. 1998), and are also involved in the current court challenge to the Florida
voucher program.
AMERICA

178

See, e.g., Vouchers: What the Research Shows, People for the American Way (Aug.

8, 2002), at http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=3014. Some opponents of voucher plans that include private school are strenuous advocates of choice
among public schools. See, e.g., RICHARD KAHLENBERG, ALL TOGETHER Now: CREATING
MIDDLE CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE

(2001).
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by a coalition of urban parents, primarily African-American, 179 who
seek better options for their children; ideological compatriots of
Milton Friedman, the economist who originated the idea of education
vouchers as a way of stimulating competition among schools; 8 and
those who see parental choice movements as the best way of promoting both fairness and educational opportunity to less affluent
families. "8"
179 The most prominent supporter of school choice in the African-American community is the Black Alliance for Educational Options, whose website is at http://
www.baeo.org (last visited Feb. 5, 2003).
180 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM ANt) FREEDOM (1962). For other economic
perspectives on vouchers, see generally David Bradford & Daniel N. Shaviro, The Economics of Vouchers, in VOUCHERS ANI) THL PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES 40-91 (C. Eugene Steurle et al. eds., 2000)
economic perspective).

(analyzing various voucher programs from an

181 See, e.g., JOHN E. COONS & STEPHEN SUGARMAN, SCHOLARSHIPS FOR CHILDREN
(1992);JosEPi-i P. VrrERrrrI, CHOOSING EQUALITY (1999). Other commentators focus
on vouchers as a way of combating the tendencies of entrenched government bureaucracies in the provision of service, see, for example,JOHN E. CHURB & TERRY M. MOE,
POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCiiOOLS (1990). James Dwyer appears to have the
most novel set of reasons for preferring a school voucher program; he would use such
a program as a way of limiting the influence of traditional religious beliefs in the
education of children. JAMES DWYER, VOUCHERS WfIHIN REASON: A CHILD CENTERED
APPROACH TO EDUCATION REFORM

the

voucher issue include:

JESSE H.

(2002). Other useful legal sources on all sides of
CHOPER,

SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY; PRINCIPLES

FOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES
SALOMONE, VISIONS OF SCHOOLING: CONSCIENCE,

186-88 (1995);

ROSEMARY C.

COMMUNITY, AND COMMON EDUCA-

242-66 (2000); Alan E. Brownstein, Evaluating School Voucher Programs Through a
Liberty, Equality, and Free Speech Matrix, 31 CONN. L. REV. 871 (1999); Neal Devins,
Social Meaning and School Vouchers, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 919 (2001); Edward B.
Foley, Judging Voucher Programs One at a Time, 27 U. DAYrON L. REV. 1 (2001); Nicole
Stelle Garnett & Richard W. Garnett, School Choice, the First Amendment, and SocialJustice, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 301 (2000); Richard W. Garnett, The Right Questions About
School Choice: Education, Religious Freedom, and the Common Good, 23 CARDOZO L. REV.
1281 (2002); John H. Garvey, What Does the Constitution Say About Vouchers? BOSTON
BJ., Feb. 2000, at 14; Steven K. Green, Private School Vouchers and the Confusion over
"Direct"Aid, 10 GEO. MASON U. CIV. Rrs. LJ. 47 (2000); Steven K. Green, The Constitutionality of Vouchers Afler Mitchell v. Helms, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 57 (2000);
Steven K. Green, The Illusionary Aspect of "Private Choice"for ConstitutionalAnalysis, 38
WILLAME'rrE L. REV. 549 (2002); Abner S. Greene, Why Vouchers Are Unconstitutional
and Why They're Not, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 397 (1999); Marci A.
Hamilton, Power, the Establishment Clause, and Vouchers, 31 CONN. L. RE'v. 807 (1999);
Steffen N. Johnson, A Civil Libertarian Case for the Constitutionality of School Choice, 10
GEO. MASON U. CIv. Rrs. L.J. 1 (2000); Frank R. Kemerer, Reconsideringthe Constitutionality of Vouchers, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 435 (2001); Stephen Macedo, Constituting Civil
Society: School Vouchers, Religious Nonprofit Organizations, and Liberal Public Values, 75
CHI.-KENr L. REV. 417 (2000); Michael W. McConnell, Government, Families, and Power:
A )efense of Education Choice, 31 CONN. L. REV. 847 (1999); Elliot M. Mincberg, School
TION
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We cannot predict with any assurance the outcome of the political struggles that have already begun to develop in Zelman's aftermath.18 2 What we can say with confidence, however, is that Zelman has
removed only one of the legal impediments to voucher programs, and
that other barriers, including novel questions of state and federal law,
remain. In this Part, we undertake the project of identifying and analyzing the legal questions most likely to appear in Zelman's wake.
These include issues of state constitutional law and its interaction with
federal constitutional law; the scope and permissibility of conditions
that states may impose on service providers in voucher programs, and
the validity of exempting religious entities from such conditions; and
the questions likely to be spawned when voucher financing is utilized
by government to transfer resources to faith-intensive providers of services other than education.
A.

State ConstitutionalLaw and the Anti-Voucher Cause

To hear the anti-voucher litigators tell the story, they had all but
given up on federal constitutional law as their principal weapon even
before the Court handed down the Zelman opinion." 3 Instead, they
have shifted their legal strategy for challenging educational voucher
Vouchers: Bad for Our Children and Dangerousfor Our Liberty, 27 DAYTON L. REV. 17
(2001); Adele Robinson, Risky Credit: Tuition Tax Credits and Issues of Accountability and
Equity, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REX'. 253 (2000); Rosemary C. Salomone, Educational
Vouchers: Legal and Policy Dimensions: Legal Dimensions of Education Vouchers, 75 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 205 (2001); Mark D. Stern, School Vouchers-The Church-State Debate That
Really Isn't, 31 CONN. L. REV. 977 (1999); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Parades,Public Squares
and Voucher Payments, 28 CONN. L. REV. 243 (1996); Symposium, Solving the Education
Crisis Through ParentalChoice, 11 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 245 (2000); and Brad J. Davidson, Comment, BalancingParentalChoice, State Interest, and the Establishment Clause: Constitutional Guidelines for States' School-Choice Legislation, 33 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 435
(2002).
182 See, e.g., Terry M. Neal, School Vouchers-Where Is the Constituency?, WASHINGTON
POST.COM, July 3, 2002, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=
article&node=&contentld=A19474-2002Jul3 (last visited Feb. 5, 2003); Robert E.
Pierre, Detroit Still Skeptical About School Vouchers and Who Really Profits; Despite Failing
Classrooms, Voters Rejected Move, WASH. POST, July 28, 2002, at A3; Brigid Schulte, Voters
Protective of Public Schools, Wary of Vouchers, WASH. POST, June 28, 2002, at Al1.
183 See, for example, the remarks of a leading anti-voucher litigator and general
counsel to the People for the American Way, Elliot Mincberg, at a Pew Forum panel
held the day after Zelman:
First, while this is an important milestone, it is by no means the end of the
legal road because despite the fact that the Court has said that it is okay
under the federal Constitution, there are many, many state constitutions
that have much more specific provisions in them that say that taxpayer
money shouldn't go to support religious institutions directly or indirectly.
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plans, and now rely on a variety of state constitutional restrictions on
material transfers to religious institutions. Indeed, in Florida, which
has the only state wide voucher program in the United States, 8 4 the
challengers filed suit against the plan in state court and raised only
state constitutional questions. 11
Florida's constitution indeed provides ammunition to the antivoucher side, but, as will be elaborated below, Florida is far from
unique. Florida's constitution contains several clauses that touch on
the relationship between the state and religion or religious institutions. The first sentence of Article I, section 3 of the state charter, in a
near-mirroring of the First Amendment to the federal constitution,
provides that "There shall be no law respecting the establishment of
religion or prohibiting or penalizing the free exercise thereof."' 8s"
The section proceeds, however, with a section suggesting limits on religious freedom, 187 and then adds the following: "No revenue of the
state or any political subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be taken
from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church,
sect, or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian
institution." 188
The Florida Constitution presents other impediments to the
voucher plan as well, 181' but this last provision of Article I, section 3,
with its sweeping prohibition on taking revenue "from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of. . .any sectarian institution" has
from the outset appeared to be a major impediment to a program that
involves public financing of tuition at religious schools. And, predictably enough, a Florida Circuit Court in early August 2002, ruled the
Discussion: Judgment Day for School Vouchers (June 28, 2002), at http://
pewforun.org/events/print.php?EventlD=30 (last visited Feb. 5, 2003).
See also the remarks of Robert Chanin, who argued Zelman for the pro-voucher
forces, quoted in Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court, 5-4, Upholds Voucher System That
Pays Jeligious Schools" Tuition, N.Y. TIMES,June 28, 2002, at Al; and Charles Lane, Court
Upholds Ohio School Vouchers; Ruling Says Program Offers Poor Families Freedom of Choice,
WASH. POST,June 28, 2002, at Al.

184 Florida's program provides vouchers only to students in public schools that fail
statewide measures of performance for two years within a period of four years. See
What Is School Choice?: Florida Scholarship Programs, School Choice Info, at
http://www.schoolchoiceinfo.org/what/florida.jsp (last visited Feb. 5, 2003).
185 Bush v. Holmes, 767 So. 2d 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
186 FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
187 Id. '("Religious freedom shall not justify practices inconsistent with public
morals, peace or safety.").
188 Id.
189 Id. art. IX, §§ 1, 6. These provisions concern the state's obligation to fund the
public schools, rather than any prohibition on aid to private, religious schools.
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Florida Opportunity Scholarship Program in violation of that provision.Y-"' With no suggestion that Zelman and its theory of intervening
private choice might have any bearing on the state law question, the
Florida Circuit Court held that the voucher program could not be
squared with the blunt prohibition on using public revenue "directly
or indirectly in aid of ... any sectarian institution."'1

As the court

put it, "To hold that this [mechanism of intervening private choice]
avoids the [constitutional] prohibition in Article I, [§] 3 would be the
functional equivalent of redacting the word 'indirectly' from this
phrase of the Constitution.

.

.

. [S]uch an interpretation would

92
amount to a colossal triumph of form over substance."!1
The Florida Constitution's strict limits on funding religious institutions are not unusual. As a number of scholars have pointed out in
recent years, nearly forty state constitutions, depending on the counting criteria, contain explicit provisions barring the use of public
money at religious schools or other religious institutions. M These
provisions have a common and troubled historical provenance; virtually all of them seem to have been a product of Protestant-Catholic
conflict over education in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. 9 4 Catholics, many of whom were recent immigrants, objected to
the Protestant character of the public schools and sought to change
that character or secure funding for their own schools. Protestants

190 Holmes v. Bush, No. CV 99-3370, 2002 WL 1809079 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 5, 2002).
Earlier claims that the program violated other provisions of the state constitution had
already been resolved in Bush v. Holmes, 767 So. 2d 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000), or
had been dismissed voluntarily. Holmes, 2002 WL 1809079, at *1 n.i. The court in
Holmes also announced, with no supporting analysis, that any federal Establishment
Clause claims concerning the Florida program had been "resolved" in Zlman. d.
191 Id. at*L.
192 Id. at *4. An op-ed in The Tampa Tribune wondered explicitly how the state
legislature and the governor had been willing to support the program in the face of
this constitutional language. Daniel Ruth, State School Voucher Scam Plunks Basic Civics
Test (Aug. 11, 2002), http://v.religionandsocialpolicy.org/news/article.cfm?
id=78.
193 The most comprehensive survey in the field is contained in Lupu & Tuttle,
supra note 123, concerning government relations with faith-based institutions. That
survey includes the text of all the relevant provisions. See also TobyJ. Heytens, School
Choice and State Constitutions,86 VA. L. REv. 117 (2000); Frank R. Kemerer, State Constitutions and School Vouchers, 120 ED. LAW REP. ];Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School
Choice, the First Amendment, and State ConstitutionalLaw, 21 HARV.J.L. & PUB. PoL'v 657
(1998); Eric Treene, The Grand FinaleIs Just the Beginning: School Choice and the Coming
Battle over Blaine Amendments, http://www.blaineamendments.org/scholarship/FedSocBlaineWP.html.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2003).

194 The best telling of this history is in Philip Hamburger's important new book.
See HAMBURC;ER, supra note 141, at 191-478.
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opposed both the change in the public schools and the funding for a
rival system of Catholic schools.
In 1875, at the height of this controversy, Republican presidential
aspirant James Blaine introduced an amendment to the federal Constitution which would have explicitly forbidden any state from authorizing lands or money devoted to public schools to be "under the
control of any religious sect," or "divided between religious sects or
denominations."' 1 5 Although Blaine's efforts at the federal level
failed, the cause he championed led to constitutional change in a
number of states, and shaped the drafting of constitutions for states
that later entered the Union. "96 Because of Senator Blaine's national
influence over this movement, these state provisions are now frequently referred to generically-especially by their enemies-as the
"Blaine Amendments." 197
Some of the Blaine Amendments have been construed narrowly,
and would now be no impediment to a Cleveland-type school voucher
program.1t"'
Still others may yet be construed to "mirror" the Supreme Court's interpretations of the federal Establishment Clause.199
195 In addition to Professor Hamburger's recent book, sources on the Blaine
Amendment include VrrERi'rT, supra note 181, at 153; Garnett & Garnett, supra note
181, at 337-38; and Steven K. Green, The Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 Am. J.
LEGAL HIsT. 38 (1992).
196 Eric Treene argues that at least six states (New Mexico, Arizona, South Dakota,
North Dakota, Montana, and Washington) "were forced by Congress to enact such
articles as a condition of their admittance into the Union." Treene, supra note 193, at
8 & n.43.
197 See id. at 3; see also Heytens, supra note 193, at 123.
198 See Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 624 (Ariz. 1999) (construing Blaine
Amendment narrowly because of its .background of religious bigotry). Wisconsin's
Blaine Amendment did not stop the Milwaukee voucher program. SeeJackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 621-23 (Wis. 1998). The Ohio Supreme Court held that Ohio's
Blaine Amendment would not be an impediment to the Cleveland voucher plan.
Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 212 (Ohio 1999). Neither the Wisconsin nor
the Ohio provision, however, included a sweeping, Florida-type bar on direct or indirect aid to a religious institution.
199 A mirroring interpretation of a state provision on church-state relations would
tie the state law to the law of the federal Establishment Clause, whatever that law
happened to be at any given moment. Whether state courts should embrace mirroring interpretations of various provisions, including those related to religion, is controversial. See Angela Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An
Emerging Post-Smith JuirInudence, 1993 BYU L. REV. 275 (documenting the trend in
state supreme courts to cut their religious liberty law loose from parallel federal law in
the wake of Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)). Prior to Zelman, some
courts refused to permit voucher-type payments to religious schools because of per-

ceived federal constitutional restrictions. See Strout v. Albanese, 178 F.3d 57 (1st Cir.
1999); Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dist., 728 A.2d 127 (Me. 1999). Both Bagty and Strout
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Moreover, the logic of the Supreme Court's opinion in Zelman, which
emphasizes the fact of parental choice rather than state transfer of
scholarship funds to religious schools, may influence the judicial interpretation of some state constitutions in which the scope of a Blaine
Amendment is an open question. To the extent Zelman rests on a
notion that parents rather than the state are responsible for the transfer of resources to religious schools, state courts may borrow from this
reasoning to conclude that similar schemes do not involve the state in
transfers of the sort forbidden by their own constitutions.
Courts in a number of states-including, as of this writing, Florida-may resist such interpretations of their Blaine Amendments.
Washington provides the best-known example of a state with a stillrobust Separationist approach to these questions. After the U.S. Supreme Court in 1986 ruled unanimously that the federal Establishment Clause did not preclude the use, at a beneficiary-selected Bible
°1 the Washcollege, of state vocational training funds for the blind, 211
ington Supreme Court held on remand of the case that the state con2 °1
stitution's Blaine Amendment nevertheless precluded such use.
In July of 2002, however, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit cast doubt on the continued validity of Washington's Blaine Amendment, at least as applied to a program of indirect
2
the panel ruled two to one that the state
funding. In Davey v. Locke, 211
constitution could not justify the exclusion, from the state-sponsored
"Promise Scholarship" program, of students majoring in theology at
private, religiously affiliated schools. The program included students
majoring in other subjects at those schools, and the panel opinion
suggests that it included as well those students studying theology as
hold that the Establishment Clause forbids Maine from including religious schools in
a voucher plan for secondary schooling of students in rural districts. Bagley and Strout
now of course must be overruled, unless state law independently supports their resuits. Shortly after the decision in Zelman, a group of Maine parents renewed their
challenge to the Maine policy upheld in Bagley. See Tess Nacelewicz, Six Maine anzilies Sue over Vouchers, PORTLAND PRESs-HERALD, Sept. 19, 2002, at IA.
200 Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
201 Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119 (1989). Article 1, section
11 of the Washington Constitution provides that "No public money or property shall
be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the
support of any religious establishment." WASH. CONST. art 1, § 11. Washington appears to be a true "separationist" state, holding religious institutions to be constitutionally distinctive for purposes of both benefits, see Witters, 771 P.2d at 1119, and
burdens. See First Covenant Church v. Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992). For further

discussion of First Covenant and its place in Separationist thinking, see Lupu & Tuttle,
supra note 39.

202

299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002).
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part of a course of study at state-run schools. 2113 The challenged exclusion, the panel majority ruled, burdened the students' rights under
the Free Exercise Clause of the federal constitution, and the state constitution applied to these facts did not promote a sufficiently compelling interest to justify the exclusion. Davey involves a form of voucher
program, and its holding casts doubt on whether Blaine Amendments
can lawfully limit state voucher programs to secular options without
2 4
running afoul of the federal Constitution. 0
Several scholars have analyzed the federal constitutional problem
presented by Washington and other states whose constitutions, as construed, would impede the inclusion of religious schools in any
voucher program that would result in a transfer of state funds to private schools. What has begun to pass for conventional wisdom among
these scholars goes something like this: Blaine Amendments, so construed, no longer have parallel interpretation' of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause for normative reinforcement. By
excluding religious entities from aid that may go to secular organizations, state law of this character: (1) presumptively violates the equal
protection clause by using religion, an arguably suspect classifying criterion, as a basis for excluding some entities from aid; (2) offends free
exercise norms by singling out religious associations for disfavored
treatment; and (3) independent of the first two arguments, violates
the Constitution because enactment of the state provision was the
5
product of anti-Catholic animusU
The first two of these theories may seem to amount to one and
the same thing, but they turn out to be fetchingly different. The
203 Id. at 753. The opinion is oblique on this point, and some ambiguity remains
concerning the state's treatment of courses on theology taught at state universities.
Id. at 755-56.
204 Our own view of Davey v. Locke is that it is correctly decided on equal protection and/or free speech grounds, and that its suggested sweeping condemnation of
Washington's Blaine Amendment is too broad. Davey relied on Church of the Lukuni
Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), to hold that all discrimination
against religion is constitutionally suspect. That decision, however, involved a coer-

cive prohibition against a religious practice, and a gerrymander of an ordinance
aimed at cruelty to animals, which was designed to impede the rituals of one and only
one sect. As we see the problem in Davey, the vice of Washington's policy is that it
singled out a particular viewpoint concerning religious studies and refused to fund it,
while financing other viewpoints about religious studies. Whatever legitimate interest
the state has in an institutional church-state separation broader than that required by
federal law, that interest cannot justify the viewpoint-based discrimination in which
Washington appears to have engaged. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (denial of funding to religious student group was impermissible viewpoint discrimination).
205 See Heytens, supra note 193, at 140-53; Treene, supra note 193, at 12-13.

2003]

ZELAIAN'S

FUTURE

equal protection argument is even-handed as between religious and
secular entities; if, after all, "religion" is a generically suspect classifying trait, it should be equally suspicious if the state favors or disfavors
religious institutions. Under this theory of equal protection, state law
that disables only religious institutions from receiving benefits is presumptively unconstitutional, but state policies that provide special accommodations for religious causes and institutions, and treat them
more favorably than their secular counterparts, are likewise presump" 6
tively invalid.
Such a doctrine is in sharp tension with the Supreme Court's invitation to legislatures in Employment Division v. Smith211 7 to make precisely such generic accommodations of religion. 2 08 Moreover, the
anti-Blaine forces tend to be protective of state-created accommodations for religious institutions and causes. Accordingly, their preferred approach to the problem of discrimination against religious
2 °9
entities rests on the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
Its premise is that the state may not generically treat religious entities
worse than secular ones. To do so is, in free exercise terms, to "burden" religious institutions by disqualifying them from opportunities
open to analogous secular organizations. 2 1 ) Those who adopt this argument, as did the Ninth Circuit panel in Davey v. Locke, presume that
all generic disfavoring of religious entities is unconstitutional unless
such policies can satisfy strict judicial scrutiny-i.e., unless the state
can demonstrate that the policy is narrowly tailored to a compelling
21
state interest. '
206 This theory would force a change in the result in decisions like East Bay Local
Development Corp. v. California, 13 P.3d 1122 (Cal. 2000) (upholding power of self-

designated exemption, for all noncommercial property owned by religious corporations, from state or local schemes of historic preservation). We discuss East Bay further in Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 39.
207 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
208 For debate on the constitutionality of such accommodations, compare Lupu,
supra note 146, with Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and
a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685 (1992).
209 The Free Exercise Clause has applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment since the Supreme Court's decision in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940).
210 For fuller explication of the notion of free exercise "burdens," see Ira C. Lupu,
Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102

HARV.

L.

REV. 933 (1989). Although that article argues that discrimination against religion in
the provision of public benefits should count as such a burden, cases later decided
tinder the Religious Freedom Restoration Act occasionally held to the contrary. See
Fordham Univ. v. Brown, 856 F. Supp. 684, 696-97 (D.D.C. 1994).
211 This standard of review is drawn from Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), which involved the imposition of coercive, animal pro-
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The Free Exercise Clause approach spares religious accommodations from its wrath, but it has a deep flaw of its own. American constitutional law, federal and state, has for many years done exactly what
this argument condemns. The law of the federal Establishment
Clause has been and continues to be that the state may not make unrestricted, direct transfers of funds to religious organizations, because
the principal activity of such organizations-religious worship-is
something which the state may neither regulate nor subsidize. 2 12 Nor
is this the only constitutionally required exclusion of religious organizations from a state protection or benefit. The state operates under
religion-specific constitutional limitations with respect to disputes, relating to property or personnel, that are internal to religious communities and organizations. 213 The state's obligation either to refrain
from intervening in such disputes, 2 4 or to adjudicate them under
principles that can be applied without reference to religious matters,2'

5

has costs as well as benefits for religious communities. These

limits on the state reduce government interference in religious affairs,
but also deprive religious factions of the opportunity for authoritative
21
dispute resolution by the state. 6
The argument that Blaine Amendments are presumptively unconstitutional because they single out religious entities for special
treatment thus proves far too much. If the line between religious and
nonreligious organizations is constitutionally suspect, each and every
religion-specific doctrine under the federal religion clauses becomes
tection legislation upon a particular religious sect, rather than the limitation of a
government benefit to secular organizations.
212 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203, 228-29 (1997).
213 For discussion of relevant principles, see, for example, Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S.
595, 602-03 (1979); Serbian East Othodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-12
(1976); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memofial Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440, 449-50 (1969); Gonzalez v. Romdn Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16-17
(1929); and Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 702-13 (1871).
214

Jones, 443 U.S. at 602-03.

215

Id.
Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of the Establishment Clause, 43 B.C.

216

L. REV. 1071, 1074 (2002). Another example of religion-specific treatment required
by the Constitution are the rulings of a number of lower court decisions to the effect
that government may not apply anti-discrimination law to the relationship between

religious entities and clergy. See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455,
460-65 (D.C. Cir. 1996). We discuss the ministerial exception at length in Lupu &
Tuttle, supra note 39, at 62-63, 72-74, 90-92. But these rulings rest on the Free
Exercise Clause as well as the Establishment Clause, and represent an immunity from
regulation rather than an exclusion from state largesse.
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constitutionally doubtful as well.2 17 An interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause that casts doubt on many longstanding constitutional
2 18
norms seems questionable indeed.
A narrower argument against the Blaine Amendments that
voucher proponents may make would focus on the change in federal
Establishment Clause law represented by recent cases, including Agostini v. Felton,2 1' I Mitchell v. Helms,2 2 11 and Zelman itself. The premise of

this theory is that states may indeed treat religious institutions differently from secular ones, but only to the extent that federal constitutional law so requires. If this were the law, states would be obliged to
ensure that they did not directly aid the specifically religious activities
of private organizations, but states with voucher programs could not
rely on their Blaine Amendments to exclude religious schools because
Zelman teaches that federal law does not so require.
This approach does not unravel existing federal constitutional
law, but it has strange consequences in the federal system. States
would be free under this theory to construe their Blaine Amendments
in only one way-to mirror whatever the U.S. Supreme Court held at
any given time was required by the Establishment Clause. This leaves
the states no authority to have a non-establishment policy broader
than whatever five Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court find to be the
content of federal law at any given moment. The upshot would be to
deny the states any room whatsoever for their own church-state policy,
even if that policy had been federal constitutional law a few short years
ago. It is hard to imagine a doctrine more hostile to notions of re217

A doctrine that made suspect all distinctions between religion and nonreligion

would also throw into doubt the various religious freedom restoration acts enacted by
the federal government, see, e.g., Religious Land Use and Instututionalized Persons
Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc (West Supp. 2003); Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2000) and many states since the Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See, e.g., ALA. CONST.
amend. 622 (ratified Jan. 6, 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-571b (2002); FLX. SrTrr.
ANN. ch. 761.01-761.04 (West 2003); 775 ILL. COMP. SrAT. ANN. §§ 35/1-35/99
(2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-22-1 to 28-22-5 (Michie 2002); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 4280.1-1 to 42-80.1-4 (2001).
218 In reaching its conclusion that all discriminations against religious entities are
constitutionally suspect, the Ninth Circuit panel in Davey v. Locke relied heavily on
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978). See Davey, 299 F.3d at 752-58. McDaniel invalidated a state law prohibition on clergy serving as elected representatives in state legislatures. Because the restriction in McDaniel operated to coercively exclude clergy
from one aspect of the right of self-government, the decision does not necessarily
extend to state law exclusions of religious entities from state largesse. But the Ninth

Circuit did not explore any such distinction.
219 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
220 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
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spect for state law, and in particular to the tradition of independent
state constitutional law. 22 ' Although justice Thomas of course was imagining that states would be pro-religion rather than the opposite, he
urged in Zelman that states be given room to fashion their own
church-state policies, and the campaign against the Blaine Amendments threatens state autonomy of precisely that character.
Sensitive to these considerations of federalism, we believe that
each state should be free to make its own constitutional policy of
church-state relations, and to extend it beyond the federal policy, so
long as the state approach serves reasonable purposes of the sort associated with the regime of Separationism. What is obvious, however, is
that those purposes need some restatement and reinvigoration. As
Separationism has come under attack in recent years, its defendersthe Zelman dissenters prominently among them-have tended to rely
excessively on justifications now viewed by many as outmoded. A result that four of nine Justices vehemently favored in Zelman may be
constitutionally reasonable, but not just because they so conclude.
Whether states can defend a Separationist policy broader than the
federal constitution requires will thus depend on the efforts ofjudges
and academics to provide precisely this sort of rehabilitation of the
222
Separationist ethos.
Separationism aside, there is one stark way for a state to reconcile
a strenuous Separationist policy with norms of equality, from wherever
they are drawn. Equality can be achieved by equalizing down as well
as up. 22 3 States can simultaneously comply with their Blaine Amend-

ments and norms of equality simply by treating religious and nonreli221 There have been several eloquent calls for the independent development of
state constitutional law. See William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protections of
Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REV. 489 (1977);Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn
of a New Century: Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions,70 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1 (1995). Indeed, friends of religious liberty, upset at the Supreme Court's decision
in Smith, 494 U.S. at 872, have urged state courts to develop independent free exercise policy under state law, and some states have done precisely that in the last dozen
years. See, e.g., First Covenant Church v. Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992). For
discussion of this trend, see generally Angela Carnella, State ConstitutionalProtectionof
Religious Exercise: An Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L. REV. 275 (documenting the trend in state supreme courts to cut their religious liberty law loose from
parallel federal law in the wake of Smith).
222 We have tried to do some of this work ourselves. See LuptI & Tuttle, supra note
39; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 9.
223 See, e.g., Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (holding
that federal law outlawing sex discrimination does not pre-empt state requirement for
maternity leave because employer can comply with both by providing paternity as well
as maternity benefits).
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gious private organizations alike, and excluding all from the aid that
the state constitution precludes going to the religious entities. Such
an approach would entail, for example, a school-choice program lim22 4
ited to public schools only.
This strategy, however, cannot help the broader voucher movement, with its emphasis on maximizing parental choice in ways that
include private schools, religious and otherwise. If courts permit the
states to maintain church-state policies more Separationist than the
federal constitution requires, is the attempt to advance the school
voucher movement by ousting the Blaine Amendments doomed to
failure? Perhaps it is not. We think there is one argument that may
yet push the attack on the Blaine Amendments over the top, but it is
the most ornery and least generic of the arguments frequently advanced against such amendments. The anti-Catholic origins of at least
some of the Blaine Amendments may be a powerful source of constitutional condemnation. The argument is made yet stronger-and the
Supreme Court's receptivity to it made more obvious-by the view expressed in the plurality opinion in Mitchell v. Helms that the judgemade doctrine that excluded "pervasively sectarian" entities from government assistance was a product of anti-Catholic bigotry. 225 The underlying premise of the Mitchell plurality is that the line of decisions
from Lemon to Aguilar, representing the high water mark of Separationism, is itself blemished by such prejudice. If it can be proven that
a particular state added a Blaine-type Amendment, blocking all forms
of material transfer to religious institutions, because of anti-Catholic
sentiment, federal constitutional law would likely support the invalidation of such an amendment.
Several discrete lines of case law, under a variety of constitutional
provisions, intertwine around this view. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye v. City of Hialeah,22 6 the Supreme Court unanimously held that a
city's policy, ostensibly designed to protect a religion-neutral concern
for animal welfare, had been gerrymandered for the purpose of impeding animal sacrifice as practiced by a particular sect, and therefore
violated the Free Exercise Clause unless it could meet the requirements of strict constitutional scrutiny. In Larson v. Valente,22 7 the
Court applied a similar doctrine under the Establishment Clause to a
Minnesota statute, regulating fund-raising practices, that the Court
found had been covertly designed to burden the Unification Church
224
225
226
227

This is the approach advocated in
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828.
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
456 U.S. 228 (1982).

KAHLENBERC.,

supra note 178.
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and to leave untouched the practices of mainstream faiths. If courts
take this approach in challenges to the Blaines, the state is not likely
to prevail; as Davey v. Locke 22' reveals, it will be very difficult to show
that a strict separationist posture, now partly repudiated in federal
law, is narrowly tailored to compelling state interests.
Away from the field of religion, the Equal Protection Clause (and
the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment) have been pressed into similar service, but with
significant doctrinal differences from the religion clause cases just described. In Washington v. Davis,22 ' the Court held that covert uncon-

stitutional purposes-in that case, alleged racial animosity-could
render a race-neutral scheme unconstitutional. In the Arlington
Heights decision,3() the Court clarified that evidence of such purposes
tainted a government decision, but did not trigger conventional strict
scrutiny; instead, it shifted the burden to the government to demonstrate that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the
impermissible motive. Perhaps the age of the Blaine Amendments
would make it unlikely that states could carry such a burden, but this
approach leaves open a plausible way for the state to preserve a Blaine
Amendment even if its past is tainted by sectarian hostility.
The legal setting of the Blaine Amendments in state constitutions, rather than statutory law, in no way immunizes them from
claims of unconstitutional motivation. In Hfunter v. Underwood,23_1 the
Supreme Court invalidated a provision of the Alabama Constitution,
disfranchising a very wide group of persons who had been convicted
of a felony. The Court found indisputable evidence that the backers
of the provision had been motivated by a desire to disfranchise African-Americans. And, most recently, the Court rendered its most controversial invalidation of a state constitutional amendment; in Romer v.
Evans,2 32 it ruled that Colorado's attempt to constitutionalize a prohi-

bition on protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination had been
motivated by a constitutionally forbidden anti-homosexual animus.
228

299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that state's interest in not appropriating

money to a religious organization was not compelling).
229 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
230 Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); see also Mt.
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (holding that proof
that the dismissal of government employee is tainted by constitutionally impermissi-

ble reason shifts burden to the state to show that the dismissal wotIld have occurred
independent of that reason).

231
232

471 U.S. 222 (1985).
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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If we are correct that the most persuasive constitutional argument
against Blaine Amendments is that each may have been motivated by
anti-Catholic animus, the path for those who are fighting for vouchers, and against the Blaine Amendments, is twisted and uphill. First,
the fight must be won on state-specific historical grounds in each and
every jurisdiction. Even if the case for anti-Catholic animus as a motivating force is supported by substantial historical evidence in some
states,'23 3 the case may not be nearly so easy to make in others. The
problem of proof may be especially acute with respect to states in the
West, where Congress frequently required states newly entering the
Union to include a Blaine-type provision in their constitutions as a
condition of entry. 234 In such states, the legislature may never have
focused precisely on the content of the Blaine Amendment, which arrived from Congress as part of an aggregated bundle of constitutional
provisions. With respect to such states, challengers may have to show
that the Congress(es) that required a Blaine Amendment as a condition of entry into the Union were moved by impermissible hostility to
the Roman Catholic Church. Evidence of this may not be easy to find,
and, influenced by the decision in United States v. O'Brien,23 5 courts

may not be receptive in any event to evidence of covert unconstitutional motivation on the part of Congress.
Moreover, an animus-based theory of why a Blaine Amendment is
unconstitutional invites the possibility of successful contemporary reenactment. If Blaine Amendments are generically unconstitutional
233 The Becket Fund is pursuing a lawsuit challenging a state constitutional provision on these grounds. See Boyette v. Galvin, No. 98-CV-10377-GAO (D. Mass. filed
Mar. 3, 1998). Information on the lawsuit is available on the Fund's website. See The
Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Litigation: Boyette v. Galvin, at http://www.becketfund.org/litigate/boyette.htinl (last visited Feb. 5, 2003). For a discussion by the
Fund's General Counsel, see Treene, supra note 193, at 12.
234 Treene, supra note 193, at 8-9. Even with respect to those states in which the
anti-Catholic case can be made, it will depend entirely on constitutional history, and
statements from legislative debates.

Of course, some Justices (most notably Justice

Scalia, whose vote may well be necessary to form a majority in favor of invalidating a
Blaine Amendment in the Supreme Court) are on record as being opposed to judicial
reliance on such evidence of covert motivation. See, e.g., Church of Luktimi Babalu
Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 557-59 (1993) (Scalia,J., concurring); Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 637-39 (1987) (Scalia,J., dissenting). By the same token, will
those who normally are willing to consider such evidence, but who dissented in
Z-elman, be willing to invalidate Blaine Amendments, sect-neutral and separationist on
their face, when confronted with such evidence? The ironies presented by the attack
on the Blaine Amendments are rich and thick, and uncertainty about the outcome in
the Supreme Court of an animus-based challenge to a Blaine Amendment affects the

overall picture for the litigants.
235

391 U.S. 367 (1968) (rejecting inquily into congressional motivation).
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because they disfavor religious entities, current enactment or reenactment of such a restriction is constitutionally doomed. If, however, a
state enacts one today in a climate that precludes an inference that it
has been motivated by sectarian animus, it would stand on the same
footing as a nineteenth century enactment in a state in which animus
could not be proven. This proposition is well illustrated by the con236
trast between the Supreme Court's decisions in Hunter v. Underwood
and Richardson v. Ramirez.237 In the former, the Court held unconstitutional a state constitutional provision disfranchising all persons convicted of crimes involving "moral turpitude," on the basis of evidence
that it had been motivated by a desire to exclude African-Americans
from the vote; 23 8s in the latter, the Court upheld a California provision

disfranchising all convicted felons, a restriction on voting that had not
2
been shown to be impermissibly motivated.

9'

If the campaign against the Blaines fails in the courts, the antiBlaine, pro-voucher forces might consider one other strategy. Perhaps Congress would have power, acting under section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, to legislate against the Blaine Amendments.
The theory would resemble that which in part underlay the Supreme
Court's willingness to uphold voting rights legislation in Katzenbach v.
Morgan2 4 -that a state law, seemingly neutral, had in part been motivated by impermissible prejudice. As we have suggested above, the
same sort of case could be mounted against the Blaines. If the antiCatholic animus underlying the enactment of many of the Blaines is
236
237
238

Hunter, 471 U.S. at 222.
418 U.S. 24 (1974).
Hunter; 471 U.S. at 227-33.

239 Richardson, 418 U.S. at 54. One can imagine, therefore, that invalidation of a
Blaine Amendment may lead to a political campaign to reenact some new version of a
comparable restriction on church-state relations. Even if contemporary reenactment

will effectively reinstate a Blaine Amendment, however, invalidation of the nineteenth
century version will place the burden of political inertia on the anti-voucher forces
rather than, as is currently the case, on the pro-voucher forces who are leading the
charge against the Blaines. The invalidation of the anti-gay amendment in Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), could not similarly be overcome by re-enactment, because
the Court held that provision invalid on its face rather than invalid solely because it
had been corrupted by covert, impermissible motivation.
240 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Kalzenbach upheld a law requiring the states to permit
voting in state elections by those literate in Spanish and educated in American-flag
schools-i.e., in Puerto Rico. The underlying theory of power to enact this measure
tinder section five of the Fourteenth Amendment was that the state restriction of the
franchise to those literate in English itself violated the Equal Protection Clause, although courts were unlikely to so hold, or that the state restriction contributed to a
likelihood of invidious discrimination against Spanish speakers in the delivery of state
services.
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sufficiently widespread, Congress arguably should have iower to legislatively preempt them all, on the theory that litigants should not be
put to the difficult burden of state-by-state proof of such prejudice.
An effort to legislate under section five, however, even if politically feasible, would no doubt face formidable constitutional obstacles. First, City of Boerne v. Flores,24 1 and the Supreme Court's still
more recent decisions on state sovereign immunity, 242 suggest growing limits on congressional power to use section five to interfere with
the legal autonomy of the states. The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, invalidated as applied to the states in City of Boerne,243 challenged
a particular Supreme Court decision in a way that an anti-Blaime enactment would not, but the overriding concerns for federalism, and
judicial control over the meaning of the Constitution, would remain.
Perhaps the fact that Congress and the Court would be moving in the
same direction on constitutional norms-as was precisely not the case
with respect to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 2 44-would

help

buttress the constitutionality of such a federal law. The Establishment
Clause, however, originally protected state religious establishments
against federal interference, 245 and one wonders if it would protect
state non-establishments with equal force.2 411To put the point differently, an anti-Blaine enactment by Congress might well be seen as a
law "respecting an establishment of religion."
This discussion of reliance on political processes to rehabilitate
or eradicate the Blaine Amendments suggests, as do many other features of this story, that the resources necessary on both sides of this
struggle may be very large indeed. State constitutional law, and its
validity under federal constitutional norms, is likely to play a major
241 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act exceeded Congress's power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment).
242 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding
that Congress did not abrogate state sovereign immunity in passing the Americans
with Disability Act).
243

City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.

244 For an argument that focuses on the relationship between the section five
power and such concerns of institutional coordination and conflict, see Daniel Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The ConstitutionalSign~fcance of an Unconstitu-

tional Statute, 56 MONr. L. REv. 39 (1995) (arguing the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act was inconsistent with First Amendment precedent and unconstitutional).
245 This of course is one of the central points of justice Thomas's concurring opinion in Zelman. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
246 For development of the argument that Congress is barred by the First Amendment from legislating on the subject of religion and state law, see Jay Bybee, Taking
Liberties with the First Anmendment: Congress, Section 5, and the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, 48 VANn. L. REx'. 1539, 1616-24 (1995).
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role in the post-Zelman struggle over vouchers, but it is impossible at
this point to identify all the ways in which the state-federal interplay
may evolve. At the least, one would expect pro-voucher strategists (as
distinguished from pure anti-Blaine strategists) to look for states without Blaine Amendments to push most aggressively for new voucher
programs. Despite the lift provided by Zelman, the question of
whether the politics of vouchers, and the constitutional law controlling vouchers, will interact productively for the pro-voucher forces is
now only a matter of long-term speculation.
B.

Conditions on Providers in Voucher-FinancedPrograms

The second major focus of post-Zelman legal controversy will
emerge from the debate about the obligations of participating schools
and social service providers. In particular, a coalition of opponents of
vouchers, those generally skeptical about using public money to educate children in private schools, and those who simply believe that
private organizations receiving public money must take on a certain
public-regarding character 47 are likely to press for a variety of conditions that providers must meet. Although there are refinements and
qualifications that we discuss below, our basic position on such conditions is simply stated-most such conditions are entirely a matter of
political discretion. The Constitution does not require them, and it
rarely forbids them. Others in the voucher wars disagree with our basic position,2 4" however, and there are subtle differences among such
conditions. Thus, we believe that it is worth breaking them down into
categories and analyzing them separately.
Perhaps the easiest set of conditions to analyze are those limited
to voucher students only. These might include requirements of nondiscrimination on many different grounds, including disability, academic performance, race, religion, and others. The Cleveland plan,
for example, did not permit participating schools to select among
those students who had been awarded an Ohio scholarship,"24 and it
247

See, e.g.,

MINOW,

supra note 175, at 92-93 (arguing that "school voucher plans

must preserve public values in the schools found eligible for the vouchers").
248 See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Scouts, Families, and School., 85 MINN. L. REV.
1917 (2001) (asserting a broad theory of freedom of association and expression for
religious institutions, whether or not they accept state benefits); Susan L. Sommer,
Lambda Legal's Letter to Congressional Leadership on the Charity Aid, Recovery,
and Empowerment Act of 2002 (Oct. 2, 2002), at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgibin/iowa/documents/record?record=1145 (taking view that government may not
subsidize discrimination).
249 The statute required selection among eligible students to be random, subject
to categorical priorities (low-income before others) and an exception for siblings of

2003]

ZELMAN'S

FUTURE

explicitly prohibited discrimination based on race, religion, and
25-0

ethnicity.

Another possible condition, narrowly tailored to voucher students only, may attach to religious education and experience expected of those students. Milwaukee, for example, requires
participating schools to offer voucher students an opt-out from religious training.2 5' Cleveland does not so require, and Florida has taken
a compromise position, permitting students to remain passive when
2 52
confronted with obligations of religious affirmation.
Any condition limited to voucher students may conceivably alter
the character of a school, but participating schools have obvious
mechanisms of control over such transformation, because of their
power to set the number of voucher students each will take. Having a
student body that includes 10% voucher students, who may not share
the faith tradition at the school, will have very different consequences
for the school's religious ambience over time than having 50% of the
students who are both voucher-supported and unconnected to the
faith. In any event, we believe that conditions limited to voucher students only will be by far the easiest to justify under the Constitution.
These are the students for whom the state is paying, and any condition that is reasonably related to the state's programmatic purpose in
financing their education should easily withstand constitutional
25-3
scrutiny.
The set of conditions much more likely to invite large-scale controversy, both political and constitutional, are those which effectively
regulate the provider in its entirety rather in its relationship to
voucher beneficiaries. Conditions of this sort, which use voucher
money to leverage control over the school as a whole, fall into several
categories. First, voucher programs may insist that participating private schools test all of their students, report their test scores, or otherpre-existing students in the
§ 3313.977 (A) (1) (West 2002).

private

schools.

See OHIo

REv.

CODE

ANN.

250 Id. § 3313.976(A) (6). The full scope of this provision is quite unclear, but all
parties in Zelman agreed that it covers admission of voucher students.
251 SeeJackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 609 (Wis. 1998).
252 The Florida plan's opt-out provision is narrower than Milwaukee's because it
forbids compulsory worship but permits compulsory religious education. See FLORIDA
STAT. ANN., ch. 229, title XVI, § 229.0537(4) (j) (West 2003) (providing voucher stu-

dents may not be compelled "to profess a specific ideological belief, to pray, or to
worship"). We discuss the constitutional significance of such opt-outs in Lupu & Tuttie, supra note 39.
253 Cf Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (holding that welfare assistance may
be conditioned on consent to reasonable home visits, which do not have to meet the
probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment).
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wise respond to concerns for academic performance and
accountability in precisely the same way that public schools must.
Such conditions present distinct and obvious benefits and costs. Taxpayers reasonably want to know whether they are supporting programs of quality, and parents trying to decide among schools can
certainly make use of such information. These goals can be only incompletely fulfilled by a condition requiring testing and reporting for
voucher students only; the number of those may be very small, and
testing and reporting about all students provides much more comprehensive information, especially for parents making choices at an early
stage in the life of the voucher program. On the other hand, testing
regimes may be expensive and may tend to alter the curriculum as
schools face pressure to teach to the evaluative tests. 2 5

4

In the experi-

mental stage of voucher programs, schools may be reluctant to participate if they must substantially change their educational protocols in
order to educate even a small number of voucher students.
Whatever their policy merits, the only constitutional questions
suggested by conditions of this sort involve issues of religious neutrality. We believe that the state has substantial discretion to impose an
accountability regime on private schools generally that is either tile
same as or different from those in the public schools, which the state
controls more totally. Zelman's emphasis on neutrality suggests that
the only constitutional constraint on conditions of accountability is
255
the obligation to treat secular and religious private schools alike.

The more constitutionally controversial conditions likely to be
imposed on voucher providers regulate their freedom of association,
or freedom of expression. The Ohio voucher program, for example,
included a provision forbidding participating schools from discriminating "on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic background,"' 256 and
another forbidding such schools from teaching "hatred of any person
or group on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion."257 The scope of the anti-discrimination provision in Ohio is unSee, e.g., Jacques Steinberg, Edg About Exams, Schools Cut the Summer Short, N.Y.
18, 2002, at Al; see also George F. Madaus, The Influence of Testing on the
Cunicluim, in ISSUES IN CURRICULUM: A SELFC-('ION OF CHAPTERS FROM PAST NSSE
YEARBOOIKS, 98 YEARIBOOK OF THIE NATIIONAL SOcIE IY FOR THE STUDE OF EDUCATION PT.
254

TMES, Aug.

II, 73-111 (MargaretJ. Early & Kenneth J. Rehage eds., 1999);Jon Marcus, "Dill-andKill" Upsets Good School, TIMEs Enuc. SUPPLEMENT, Oct. 1, 1999, at 13; RobertJ. Marzano, Building Curriculum and Assessment Around Standards, Hicii SAHooL MAC., Mar.

1999, at 14-t9.
255 We strongly doubt the constitutionality of an exemption from accountability
requirements for religious schools alone. See infra text accompanying notes 279-82.

256 Oi-o RFV. CODi, ANN. § 3313.976(A) (4) (West 2002).
257 Id..§ 3313.976(A)(6).
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certain; no party in Zelman challenged it, and it may or may not apply
to admission of non-voucher students, or to hiring of teachers or
other school staff. The anti-hate provision, by contrast, seems crystal
clear in its exclusion of certain messages from those advanced by the
school, but here too no challenge has yet been made to the provision
by a school or anyone else.
If either of these conditions were imposed coercively on schools
independent of state-created benefits, we think the case for their unconstitutionality might be quite strenuous indeed, and in any event would
be considerably stronger than the case for their unconstitutionality as
conditions on benefits. The anti-hate provision singles out points of
view and outlaws their transmission to the young. Our tradition of
free speech suggests ample protections for these points of view, however obnoxious, against government attempts to generally suppress
them.2 58 Teaching that the Christian view of God and the world is
correct, for example, implies that some other views are mistaken, and
the state may not preclude such teaching, nor specify the intensity or
259
language with which it is accomplished.

If completely detached from state benefits, an anti-discrimination
condition is likely to be constitutional in most of its applications, but
somewhat doubtful in others that impinge on freedom of religious
association and expression. Religious schools' most powerful claim to
be free from anti-discrimination law arises from their interest in limiting the religious identity of students or employees, especially employees whose efforts shape the religious mission of the school. 2 1° The
Supreme Court's decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale261 protects
258 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (cross-burning); Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (denunciation of racial minorities); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (anti-Catholic phonograph record). Justice Holnes's famous dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), urged protection for "the
expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death" unless
they presented imminent danger of grave harm. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
259 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that government may not
specify the language with which political sentiments may be expressed). The only
settled exception to this principle would be for language that incites to imminent
lawless action. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (distinguishing between
advocacy and incitement).
260 A comparable claim by religious schools to engage in racial or ethnic exclusion
of students or employees would likely fare much worse. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (tejecting claim of free exercise immunity from
Internal Revenue Code's requirement of no racial discrimination in academic policies

as condition of tax exemption for religiously affiliated college); Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160 (1976) (racial discrimination by private academies violates Civil Rights
Act of 1866).
261 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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the associational freedom of private, cause-oriented organizations to
select their spokespersons, and it is no great leap from Dale to the
associational freedom of a school to select its students on the basis of
communal, faith-based identity. Similar considerations would support
limiting employees to members of the faith around which the school
is organized, or to exclude, as in Dale, students or faculty whose views
or behavior is deemed inconsistent with that faith. A sunday school
housed in a place of worship, for example, should be free to limit its
students to those whose families share its religious commitments, and
to exclude from its teaching staff those not of its faith and those it
262
deems to be sinners.
Once the state offers benefits in exchange for limitations on expression or association, however, appraisal of the constitutionality of
these limits inevitably must change. Unlike the situation with respect
to free-standing prohibitions, religious institutions may escape the
force of such conditions by rejecting the accompanying benefits. That
said, virtually every school engaged in day-long instruction of the
young receives such benefits, and they cannot be easily rejected. Perhaps the most important and universal such benefit is accreditation,
which permits parents to satisfy the compulsory attendance laws by
sending their children to an approved school. States have relied on
this benefit of accreditation to justify a variety of autonomy-limiting
regulations on curriculum, teacher credentials, and other attributes of
educational institutions. 2 1 3 The financial support that vouchers bring
262 The line of lower court decisions protecting the right of religious organizations
to be free of anti-discrimination law in choosing clergy supports the autonomy of
religious schools in selecting spokespersons for their religious tradition. See, e.g.,
EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 460-65 (D.C. Cir. 1996); McClure v.
Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560-61 (5th Cir. 1972). Many religious institutions
offer programs of weekend or after-school instruction in their culture, customs, and
worship. Would the Constitution permit the state to outlaw religious discrimination
in hiring teachers for such a program, or to regulate what is taught-positive or negative-about various faith traditions? We doubt it. See, e.g., Farrington v. Tokushige,
273 U.S. 284 (1927) (holding that territory of Hawaii may not forbid parents of Japanese descent from providing after-school instruction in programs teaching Japanese
language and ctlture).
The federal civil rights laws, and many state laws as well, permit religious entities
to discriminate in favor of co-religionists for all positions. This policy has been upheld against Establishment Clause attack, see Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327 (1987), but there is no reason to suppose that it is required by the Constitution with respect to all positions in religious organizations.
263 See New Life Baptist Chtrch Acad. v. East Longmeadow, 885 F.2d 940 (1st Cir.
1989) (Breyer, .J.) (holding state has broad power to impose conditions of accreditation on religious school). justice Breyer cited this opinion in his Zelnan dissent.
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2506 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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merely adds political impetus, not constitutional warrant, for the imposition of regulatory conditions.
The state has considerable-though not infinite-leeway to impose limits on state-benefitted schools that the First Amendment
would not tolerate if applied coercively to all expressive organizations.
We cannot in this space tackle the entire, unwieldy subject of unconstitutional conditions, 26 4 but we can at least make a reasonable appraisal of the ways in which these issues might be framed. First, the
2
Supreme Court's oft-reaffirmed decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters 65
creates an obligation for states to permit private schools, religious and
otherwise, as alternatives to the public schools as a means of satisfying
compulsory education requirements. Accordingly, a sweeping condition on accreditation that all schools be secular would without ques2
tion violate the federal Constitution. ""
Second, at a minimum, conditions on schools that wish to participate in a voucher program must be reasonable in light of the pro-

gram's purposes and other legitimate governmental concerns.2 67 On
this score, it will be impossible to persuade judges that anti-discrimination conditions that apply to the admission of students, or to hiring
for all but the most religiously sensitive positions, are unreasonable.

Ensuring equal opportunity for students to attend publicly supported
schools, or for employees to work in such schools, comports with public policy that has been widely adopted in the United States for the last
264 The leading academic works on the subject include David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67
N.Y.U. L. REv. 675 (1992); Richard A. Epstein, UnconstitutionalConditions, State Power,
and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1988); Seth Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984);
Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151 (1996); and Kathleen M. Sullivan,
UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1413 (1989). Dean Sullivan has recently
expressed her unease over the consequences for religious entities that take public
money and alter their character to comply with conditions imposed. See Kathleen M.
Sullivan, The New Religion and the Constitution, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1397 (2003).
265 268 U.S. 510 (1925). The full name of the decision, rarely used, is Pierce v.
Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Maiy.
266 In Vouchers Within Reason, Professor James G. Dwyer argues that school vouchers should be available to all, but that voucher schools should not be free to teach
religious doctrines, such as antifeminism, that conflict with certain presuppositions of
liberalism. See DwVER, supra note 181. For reasons we develop below in connection
with possible restrictions on expression by voucher schools, we think this proposal is
in fundamental tension with Pierce.
267 See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (upholding unannounced, warrantless home visits to welfare beneficiaries as reasonably related to child-protecting pur0
poses of the welfare program).
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thirty years or more. 2"8 It may be that religious schools can insist that
classes in theology, or other aspects of religious culture, be taught
only by persons from within a particular faith tradition. The state's
interest in regulating hiring for such positions, even if it supports the
school through vouchers, seems especially weak. Beyond this narrow
group of courses, however, schools will have a difficult time arguing
that they should be free to accept voucher payments while simultaneously repudiating limits on their hiring discretion. Schools that want
history, or chemistry, or any other secular subject taught from a particular religious perspective will simply have to insist that members of
their instructional staff, whatever their faith, communicate that relig9

2
ious dimension. 6

Voucher conditions that limit the content of expression by
schools and their agents arguably present tougher First Amendment
questions. For example, the Cleveland voucher program included a
restriction on "teach [ing] hatred of any person or group on the basis
of race, ethnicity, national origin or religion." 2 7" Analyzing this sort of
restriction requires attention to a line of decisions, most recently
capped by Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 27 1 in which the Supreme
Court has drawn a series of lines between acceptable and unacceptable restrictions on speech by government-financed private entities.
268 See Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1984); see also Bob.Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (rejecting claim of free exercise immunity
from Internal Revenue Code's requirement of no racial discrimination in academic
policies as condition of tax exemption for religiously affiliated college); Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (racial discrimination by private academies violates
Civil Rights Act of 1866).
269 Lest our argument be misunderstood, we want to emphasize that the conditions we are discussing are entirely a matter of political discretion. The Constitution
does not forbid them, but neither does it require them, and legislatures are free to
omit them from all voucher schools. See ConstitutionalRole of Faith-Based Organizations
in Competitionsfor Federal Social Service Funds: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciaty, 107th Cong. 32 (2001) (statement of Ira. C.
Lupu, Louis Harkey Mayo Research Professor of Law, George Washington School of
Law), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/72981 (last visited Feb. 5, 2003).
270 Oi-no REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.976(A) (6) (West 2002).
271 531 U.S. 533 (2001). Velazquez produced a surprising five-to-four invalidation
of an expressive restriction on a government-funded private entity. Four of the five
Justices in the Zelman majority are also in the Velazquez dissent. So those on the Court
most receptive to use of vouchers at religious schools are least receptive to controlling
the government's ability to condition its transfers on speech restrictions, and four of
the Justices most willing to invalidate such speech restrictions are constitutionally opposed to use of vouchers at religious schools. Justice Kennedy, who authored Velazquez, is the only Justice to join in both of these opinions of the Court. Here, as was
the case in the discussion of the Blaine Amendments, the ironies are rich, and the
tensions among positions by various Justices are thick.
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These decisions are not a model of clarity and consistency, to say the
least, but certain key principles stand out, and all of them can be fruitfully applied to schools participating in voucher programs.
First, the cases suggest a crucial distinction between situations involving government promotion of particular messages-e.g., in favor
of decency in art,2 72 or carrying pregnancies to full term 27 -through
the financing of private speakers, and the government contracting for
2 74
some service independent of the delivery of any particular message.
Government power to restrict speech is less in the latter situation, because the state cannot make the claim that it is simply controlling its
agents' transmission of a message that the agent has been engaged to
deliver.
Are voucher schools the agents of government and its chosen
messages? They cannot be in the absolute sense, because the government may not employ religious speech as part of its own. But accredited schools are always in some sense acting as agents of the state, and
the state has sufficient reason to control the content of some of their
messages. The regulation of curriculum, common to accreditation efforts, is a viewpoint-neutral regulation of content-it specifies the subjects which the school must address. Moreover, the regulation of
messages of intolerance or hatred for religious or racial groups is
bound up with education for citizenship in a liberal, inclusive democracy. Thus, for the state to insist on this particular exclusion from the
school's message seems to us a reasonable regulation of curricular
content. By contrast, the school's affirmative statement of its own religious commitments-for example, the divinity of Jesus, or the prophetic status of Moses or Mohammed-is beyond the scope of state
control. The state has no legitimate interest in barring such a message, and to permit it to do so would be to effectively exclude certain
faiths from operating schools, contrary to the requirements of
Pierce.275
272 See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
273 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
274 See O'Hare Truck Serv. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996); Bd. of
Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996). These decisions extend to government
contractors the First Amendment protections of government employees, whose statements on matters of "public concern" are entitled to First Amendment protection
unless they substantially interfere with the performance of his duties or the operations of the agency where the employee works.

275

We recognize that our formulation leaves open the problem of a faith that

describes its affirmative beliefs in negative terms about others-i.e., to be a believing
X, you must adhere to the following principles, including the principle that Ys are

instruments of the devil. We think that in such a case, the state could insist that the
anti- Y precept be omitted from the teaching at a state-approved school, and left to be
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Second, the cases involving restrictions on government-financed
speakers emphasize the breadth of the restriction's impact on a
speaker's overall expressive activity, including the portion which may
be privately financed.2 76 If the government exacts from the speaker a
promise to refrain from the message under all circumstances, privately or publicly supported, or otherwise makes it practically impossible for the speaker to communicate the message on her own, it is
using its resources impermissibly to gain leverage over wholly private
speech.
This consideration, as applied to schools participating in voucher
programs, is not likely to strengthen the argument against such conditions. In defense of a restriction on hate speech in voucher schools,
the government could responsibly argue that participating religious
communities are free to operate more than one school, and preach
whatever hatred they want in those schools that do not accept voucher
students. More realistically and powerfully, the government can argue
that faith communities are quite entirely free to preach hatred of
others in their worship activities, or other communicative efforts,
outside of school. These activities are constitutionally outside of regulatory control as well as government financial support. So religious
communities may teach religious animosity toward others, but they
may be restricted from teaching such attitudes in state-supported
schools, whether the support takes the form of vouchers or is limited
to accreditation.
Third, government is under a more strenuous obligation to permit competing viewpoints when its resources are provided in a way
that can be characterized as the creation of a public forum. Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the University of Virginid277 and Widmar v. Vin-

cent2 7 present such cases in the context of religious association and
expression. Ordinarily, however, the provision of public serviceseven if they have an expressive component-is conceptually distinct
from the creation of a forum for debate. Unlike the context of public
fora, in which the state provides resources for the very purpose of association and expression, school choice programs have the narrower
transmitted in other settings. We would distinguish such a case, however, from that
presented by a faith that teaches its own exclusivity as the path to salvation, and the
damnation of those who do not adhere to it. We do not think the state could bar
such a teaching, even at a school which it subsidizes, because the teaching would
represent a core element of the faith's selfdefinition.
276 See Finley, .524 U.S. at 612; Rust, 500 U.S. at 197; FCC v. League of Women
Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 400 (1984).
277 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
278 454 U.S. 263 (1981).

20031

ZELMAN'S

FUTURE

and more focused purpose of delivering educational service to the
young in the community. Thus, the state can and should exclude incompetent or highly inefficient providers from such a service program. Policies of this sort are entirely alien to the concept of a public
forum, in which speakers are presumed equal in their right to participate. For example, a voucher program may exclude schools that
teach that the Earth is flat, even though a public forum on the shape
of the planet may not exclude such a view.
We consider one final question concerning conditions on
voucher schools. If religious schools are not constitutionally exempt
from such regulation, may the state legislatively exempt religious
schools only from such conditions? The Supreme Court has held that
such exemptions are sometimes permissible and sometimes not. The
leading pro-exemption decision, Corp. of PresidingBishop v. Amos, 279'
upheld a statutory exemption for religious entities from the prohibition on religious discrimination in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. 2 °1 Accommodations of this sort, which protect associational freedom of religious organizations to prefer their own members, can be
justified on a theory of equality-they permit religious communities,
like other organizations, to prefer those who are ideologically in tune
with existing members.
Other discretionary accommodations, however, that have the
quality of religious preferences rather than equalizers, have fared
badly in the Supreme Court, 28 1' and the constitutional presumption is
against them. Accommodations of religious institutions alone are justifiable only when, as in Amos, failure to accommodate them poses
some unique threat to their religious mission, and the threat to secular entities is not similar. In general, we think that the case for preferring religious schools to secular private schools with respect to
conditions concerning curriculum, accountability, and teacher cre279

483 U.S. 327 (1987).

280 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 702 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1
(2000)).
281 See Bd. of Educ. of KiryasJoel Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (holding that statute creating special school district following village lines, for a religious
enclave incorporated as a village to exclude all but its practitioners, violated Establishment Clause); Tex. Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding that sales tax exemption provided by Texas statute for religious periodicals violated Establishment
Clause); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (holding that the Connecticut statute that provides Sabbath observers with an absolute and unqualified
right not to work on their Sabbath, violates the Establishment Clause). For a more
complete discussion, see Lupu, supra note 146 (arguing for equal treatment instead

of accommodation).
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dentials (as distinguished from religious identity), to name a few, is
quite weak.
As we have argued elsewhere,28 2 the Constitution should require
neutrality between religious and secular entities unless a case can be
made that distinctive attributes of religious communities justify different treatment. For most conditions that states will impose on schools
participating in voucher programs, no such case for religious distinctiveness can be made. Nothing in Zelman operates to change the law
in ways that would or should have impact on the scope of state power
to create religion-specific accommodations.
C.

Zelman and the Charitable Choice Movement

The context of Zelman is education, but in principle its approval
of indirect funding of services provided by religious entities extends
seamlessly to other social services. 283 Formal neutrality and "true private choice" remain the measure of constitutionality. Moreover, state
constitutions are likely to present many of the same impediments to
inclusion of faith-based providers of social services as they do to the
inclusion of religious schools, and the fights over conditions on
voucher providers will arise in these other contexts as well.
These observations are not merely academic. The 1996 welfare
reform statute expressly recognized the role that religious organizations may play in welfare-to-work programs, 2 ' I and Congress is currently considering reauthorization of that scheme. From the very first
days of his administration, President Bush has made it a centerpiece
of his agenda to promote the inclusion of faith-based organizations as
partners with government in the provision of social services of many
kinds.28 5 Moreover, major bills have been introduced, in both the
282 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 39.
283 The lower courts have already recognized this. See Freedom From Religion
Found. v. McCallum, 214 F. Supp. 2d 905 (W.D. Wis. 2002) (McCallum 11), affd, No.
02-3102, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 6301 (7th Cir. Apr. 2, 2003); see also infra note 292.
284 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C., including 42 U.S.C. § 604a et seq. (2000)). For discussion of constitutional
questions raised by the Act, see Lupu & Tittie, supra note 39. See also Susanna
Dokupil, A Sunny Dome with Caves of Ice: The Illusion of Charitable Choice, 5 TEX. REV. L.
& PoL. 149 (2000); Elbert Lin et al., Faith in the Courts? The Legal and PoliticalFuture of
Federally-FundedFaith-Based Initiatives, 20 YALE L. & PoL' REV. 183 (2002); Jonathan
Friedman, Note, Charitable Choice and the Establishment Clause, 5 GEO. J. ON FiGrrrING
PoVwRTv 103 (1997).

285 See Exec. Order 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499 (Jan. 31, 2001), reprinted in 5
U.S.C.A. 601 (West Supp. 2002); Exec. Order 13198, 66 Fed. Reg. 8497 (Jan. 31,
2001), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. 601 (West Supp. 2002). The Order on Agency responsi-
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House 2 6 and Senate, 2 7 that would expand the regime of "Charitable
Choice," as the welfare reform arrangements are known, into a wide
variety of other federally-financed social services.
These schemes typically include explicit affirmations of the right
of religious organizations to maintain their religious identity while
serving the public as a partner with government.2 8 Some of them
explicitly affirm the right of faith-based organizations to prefer co-religionists in their hiring, 28 9 though such discrimination is forbidden
with respect to service beneficiaries. 2911 All such proposals explicitly
forbid faith-based organizations that obtain contracts with government from engaging in religious proselytizing, worship, or instruction
29
with government funds. '
Despite statutory prohibitions of this latter sort, charitable choice
arrangements are thick with constitutional questions about the finan292
cial relationship between government and faith-based providers.
bilities creates centers for the Faith-Based Initiative in five major federal departments-HUD, Labor, Justice, Health & Human Services, and Education. These
centers' agencies have been busy for the past eighteen months in assessing their departments' performance, recommending administrative change, and initiating new
actions to include faith-based organizations as partners with government in the provision of social services. See, e.g., The Center for Faith Based and Community Initiatives, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services (last revised Dec. 16, 2002) at http://
www.hhs.gov/fbci; Bill Broadway, Faith-Based Groups Benefit from New Federal Grants,
WASH. Posr., Aug. 3, 2002, at B9, available at http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/
news/article.cfin?id=58 (last visited Feb. 5, 2003). On December 12, 2002, President
Bush issued two additional executive orders relating to the Faith-Based and Community Initiatives, Equal Protection of the Laws for Faith-Based and Community Organizations, and Responsibilities of the Department of Agriculture and the Agency for
International Development with Respect to Faith-Based and Community Initiatives.
For our explanation and analysis of these orders see Ira. C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle,
Developments in the Faith-Based and Community Initiatives: Comments on Notices
of Proposed Rulemaking and Guidance Document (Jan. 2003), at http://www.
religionandsocialpolicy.org/docs/legal/reports/ I-9-2003_exec orderanalysis.pdf.
286 Community Solutions Act of 2001, H.R. 7, 107th Cong. (2001).
287 The most recent version is the Charity Aid, Recovery, and Empowerment Act
of 2003, S. 272, 108th Cong. (2003).
288 42 U.S.C. § 604a(d) (1999).
289 H.R. 7 did so affirm, but this was very controversial and did not pass the Senate, although H.R. 7 did pass the House. 147 CONG. REC. D733 (2001); see Mary Leonard, House Ok's Faith-Based Initiative, BOSTON GLOBE, July 20, 2001, at Al.
290 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C § 604a(g) (2000); see also Community Solutions Act of 2001,
H.R. 7, 107th Cong. § 201 (2001).
291 42 U.S.C. § 604a(j); see also Community Solutions Act of 2001, H.R. 7, 107th
Cong. § 201 (2001).
292 Courts have begun to confront these questions. See, e.g., Freedom From Religion Found. v. McCallum, 214 F. Supp. 2d 905 (W.D. Wis. 2002) (McCallum II) (holding that states may finance faith-intensive drug treatment in drug offender referral
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The President and his advisors on this subject continually emphasize
the need for a "level playing field" on which secular and religious
groups can compete for these contracts, but constitutional limitations,
reflected in Mitchell v. Helms2 '-3" and Agostini v. Felton,2 9 4 on direct funding of religious activity by government impede that sort of leveling.
Secular organizations may obtain the government's aid in the use of
secular methods of service, but faith-intensive organizations may not
similarly get the government's financial support for their religiously
1
distinctive methods of service.9

5

Given its approval of voucher programs that transfer funds from
government to private religious organizations, Zelman represents the

only constitutionally acceptable path for realizing the "level playing
field" the President seeks. As applied to social service programs, the
voucher device would permit government to finance beneficiaries
who choose to obtain services at faith-based providers, so long as secular providers were among the available choices. And the fact that the

programs may have varying degrees of faith content, from the mildest
to the most intense, would itself have no effect on the program's constitutional status. Indeed, for service contexts in which faith-intensive
methods are most comprehensive and widely in use, voucher financing may be the only method that will permit faith-based providers to
program in which Financing turned on genuine beneficiary choice), affd, No. 023102, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 6301 (7th Cir. Apr. 2, 2003). Six months earlier, in the same
litigation, the court ruled that direct financing by the state of the same faith-intensive
provider violated the Establishment Clatise. Freedom From Religion Fotind. v. McCallum, 179 F. Stipp. 2d 950 (W.D Wis. 2002) (McCallm 1). The state did not appeal
the decision in McCallutm I. See also ACLU v. Foster, No. 02-1440, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13778 (E.D. La.July 25, 2002) (ordering preliminary in junction against aspects
of Louisiana abstinence program found to violate Establishment Clause). We comment on Foster in Legal Analysis, The Roundtable on Religion & Social Welfare Policy (July 26, 2002), at http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/legal/legal-update.
cfm?id=7.
293 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
294 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
295 See McCallum, 179 F. Supp. at 979-80 (McCallum 1). A crucial constitutional
question for the charitable choice movement is whether the constitutional prohibition on aid to "pervasively sectarian organizations" survives Mitchell v. Helns. We think
the prohibition does not so survive, but at least one lower court has disagreed in the
context of aid to social service efforts. loste; 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13778 (ordering
preliminary injunction against aspects of Louisiana abstinence program found to violate Establishment Clause). In November of 2002, the parties settled the Fostercase,
in an agreement that eliminated the ban on funding "pervasively sectarian institutions" bit maintained the other restrictions and monitoring requirements of the
court's order. Settlement Agreement, Foster, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13778 (on file
with authors).
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participate at all. The Bush administration has internalized Zelman's
lesson; in his State of the Union address in January 2003, President
Bush announced his plan to introduce a three-year, $600 million
voucher program for faith-based and other programs to address sub29
stance addiction. 6
Outside of education, however, the application of Zelnan's principles presents new and less secure dimensions for voucher financing of
faith-based services. To be sure, the requirement of religion-neutral
classes of voucher recipients and service providers should prove no
more an obstacle outside the education context than it did in Zelman.
Moreover, the placement of the burden of persuasion on those who
challenge the voucher program certainly should bolster the case for
other programs that include faith-based providers.
With respect to the relevant universe of choices, however,
voucher programs for services other than education stand on less certain ground. Educational vouchers typically appear in settings in
which government provides the service itself and offers a substantial
number of the available choices. In most areas of social service, by
contrast, government tends to finance privately provided services
rather than to operate such programs directly. In some contexts, such
as child care, there tends to be a healthy mix of religious and nonreligious providers. 29- 7 For other services, such as substance abuse
treatment programs, the pool of providers tends to be dominated by
faith-based providers-especially if one considers, as most courts do,
that twelve-step programs count as "religious."2 9 The preponderance
of faith-based providers arises, at least in part, because some service
areas tend to attract more faith-intensive service approaches or therapies than others. Welfare-to-work readily lends itself to secular methods, but rehabilitation of prisoners, 299 and programs designed to
296 George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003), in 149 CONG.
REc. H213 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2003). The details of the program are included in the
White House Fact Sheet: Providing Help To Heal Americans Struggling with Addiction, Jan. 30, 2003, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/
20030130-22.html.
297 We discuss this in detail in Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 9, at 564.
298 See, e.g., DeStefano v. Emergency Hous. Group, 247 F.3d 397, 407 (2d Cir.

2001) (holding Alcoholics Anonymous program was a religion under Establishment
Clause analysis); see also Warner v. Orange County Dept. of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068 (2d
Cir. 1997) (holding that county may not condition probation on participation in Alcoholics Anonymous because of AA's religious content), reaffd after renand, 173 F.3d

120 (2d Cir. 1999).
299 See R.G. Ratcliffe, Christianity at Center of Texas Faith-Based Aid, HOUSTON
CHRON., Feb. 4, 2001, at I (discussing successes of Inner Change Freedom Initiative, a
"New Testament-based prison redemption program"). Americans United for Separa-
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teach sexual abstinence to teenagers,-41 " are likely to attract a high percentage of providers that use explicitly religious methods to try to
transform those with whom they are engaged. In such circumstances,
government may be under considerable pressure to bring secular
providers into the service market, although Zelman liberates the government from any obligation to ensure that the secular options are as
plentiful or as attractive as the religious ones.
The pair of decisions in Freedom From Religion Foundation v. McCal-

lumn()I highlights both the distinction between direct and indirect financing, and the problem of government provision of non-religious
alternatives, constitutionally required to validate the choice of a faithbased provider as "true" and "independent." McCallum is among the
first, and thus far the most important, of the decisions connecting the
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause rulings to charitable choice
programs. In January 2002, the court held unconstitutional a welfareto-work program that transferred funds from the state's Department
of Workforce Development (DWD) to Faith Works, Inc, a faith-intensive treatment program for substance abuse. DWD made the grants,
which transferred $150,000 from DWD to Faith Works in 1998 and
another $450,000 in 1999, in response to a proposal from Faith Works
to provide a nine-month, residential "addiction recovery program for
men" that is a "faith-based, long-term residential, holistic program
that emphasizes spiritual, physical, emotional and economic well2 The program included (1) a faith-enhanced,
ness." 311
twelve-step recovery process led by paid counselors and volunteer leaders; (2)
individual and group counseling by Faith Works counselors; (3) training in skills related to job readiness and overall living; (4) housing
assistance; and (5) aftercare counseling. The DWD grants did not detion of Church and State recently filed suit against Iowa prison officials and the Inner
Change Freedom Iniative. The suit alleges a number of Establishment Clause violations in the prison's faith-intensive rehabilitation program. See Laurie Goodstein,
Group Sues Christian Program at Iowa Prison, N.Y.

TIMES,

Feb. .13, 2003, at A39. We

analyze the lawsuit in Legal Analysis, The Roundtable on Religion & Social Welfare
Policy (Mar. 14, 2003) at http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/legal/legal-update.
cfin?id=13.
300 See Foste; 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13778.
301 179 F. Supp. 2d 950 (W.D. Wis. 2002) (McCallum 1); 214 F. Supp. 2d 905 (W.D.
Wis. 2002) (McCallum I), affd, No. 02-3102, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 6301 (7th Cir. Apr. 2,
2003). For a thorough explication of this case, see our analysis in Legal Analysis, The
Roundtable on Religion & Social Welfare Policy (June 3, 2002), at http://
www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/legal/legal-update.cfm?id=3. Much of our description, and some of our analysis, of McCallum I is drawn from comments that we have

posted on that website.
302

McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 958, 963 (McCallurn I).
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pend on the number of beneficiaries who chose to participate in the
program.
Synthesizing the Supreme Court's recent decisions on direct aid
to religious entities, and emphasizing the concurring opinion in
Mitchell v. Helms, the court concluded that the central question raised
by this grant was whether any religious indoctrination that occurred in
the DWD-financed program was "attributable to the state. 3- °1 It then
examined closely the details of the program, including what the grant
paid for and the degree of religious experience that was included in
the program. With respect to the particulars of the program, the
court found that state funds were supporting counselor salaries as well
as other program expenses. Counselors were participating in, among
other things, faith-enhanced Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings at
which attendance by participants was mandatory, and counselors were
always available "to facilitate a transformation of the mind and soul" of
participants. 3 1 4 Moreover, the court expressed the view that traditional AA meetings, even without the faith enhancement, are "religious as a matter of law.'"30 5 Accordingly, the court found that the state
bore responsibility for directly financingreligious experience for program participants, and that the direct grant therefore violated the Es30 6
tablishment Clause.
At the same time it made that ruling, however, the court took
under advisement a related constitutional claim against a beneficiary
choice program involving Faith Works. This program involved placement of drug offenders, by agents of the state's Department of Correc303 Id. at 971 (McCallum I).
304 1I. at 968 (McCallum I).
305 Id. (McCallum I) (citing Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 480 (7th Cir. 1996)).
306 The court rejected the argument by Faith Works that only 20% of counselor
time was devoted to spiritual counseling, and that Faith Works raised non-governmental funds sufficient to support that 20%. Because the organization commingled its
public and private funds, and expected that spiritual activities would be integrated
into all of the counselors' responsibilities, the government was effectively paying for
religious experience for participants. Although the court noted that the documents
governing the grant specified that "grant funds may not be used to attempt to support
either religious or anti-religious activities," id. at 964, the court also observed that
DWD's agents ignored the faith components of the program (obvious from the organization's mission statement, employee handbook, and its proposal to DWD) and never
communicated to Faith Works that state funds should not be allocated to religious
activities. The court ruled that the state must show that it has an adequate system in
place to safeguard against direct state financial support for religious activity, and that
unenforced, boilerplate language in the contract would not be sufficient for this purpose. The court ruled that the DWD funding of Faith Works violated the Establishment Clause and ordered the state "to cease all funding of Faith Works through the
[DWD] discretionary grant as it is currently implemented." Id. at 982.
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tions (DOC), in substance abuse treatment at Faith Works, among
other providers. 1 1 7 In 1999, DOC entered into a contract with Faith

Works, under which DOC would pay Faith Works on a per beneficiary
basis if and when beneficiaries received services through the program.""" Under the program, a DOC probation or parole agent
would refer qualified offenders to substance abuse treatment as an
alternative to incarceration (or other forms of DOC control). Beginning in 1999, Faith Works was among a number of treatment programs in the Milwaukee area eligible to receive DOC referrals. Faith
Works was the only program offering nine to twelve-month treatment,.
compared to the two- to three-month programs offered by other providers. DOC policies permitted agents to recommend Faith Works to
eligible offenders, but required the agents to inform offenders that
non-religious treatment alternatives were available.
In July 2002, the district court upheld the constitutionality of the
DOC arrangement with Faith Works. °(-' Drawing heavily from the Supreme Court's decision in Zelman, Judge Crabb wrote that the chief
question to be resolved was "whether offenders under the supervision
of the department who participate in the Faith Works program do so
of their own independent, private choice."" ' To resolve the issue of
"independent private choice," Judge Crabb focused on the DOC's referral process and based her decision on two considerations. First, she
determined that the DOC's policy required its agents to offer a secular treatment alternative to offenders, and to inform them that they
were not required to attend Faith Works if they objected to its religious content. 3 1' Second, the judge found that "there is no evidence
suggesting that offenders who reject a particular program are punished in any way. "312
307 The factual details in this paragraph are from Freedom From Religion Foundation
v. McCallum, 214 F. Supp. 2d 905 (W.D. Wis. 2002) (McCalum II).
308 In the 1999 contract, DOC would reimburse Faith Works up to $50,000 for
providing five spaces in the nine-month program. DOC renewed the contract in 2000
and 2001 for only two spaces.
309 Id. at 907-08 (McCallum II).
310 Id. at 907 (McCallum H).
311 Id. at 915 (McCallum II). DOC was able to document not only its general policy, but the specific steps its agents had taken to inform the offenders referred to
Faith Works of their options, and the fact that these offenders had affirmatively selected Faith Works.
312 Id. (McCallum H). Following Zelman, Judge Crabb declined to presume that
the state had limited offenders' choices to religious providers. Instead, she placed the
burden on plaintiffs to show that the offenders' apparent freedom of choice was illusory. The plaintiffs did not meet this burden.
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We have serious doubts about Judge Crabb's analysis of the beneficiary choice program operated by DOC. In her assessment of that
choice, the judge followed closely Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion in Zelman, and, unsurprisingly, her analysis shares both the
clarity and the weaknesses of the Zelman majority. The district court's
inquiry into the offender's choice of treatment program, like the Supreme Court's analysis of parental choice in Cleveland, does not pay
close attention to the possibility that the state is steering participants
toward religious experience.
Perhaps the starkest example of this inattention to the particular
context of choice comes in Judge Crabb's comparison between the
offenders under DOC control and the Cleveland schoolchildren in
the Zelman case. She asserts that the offenders are less "susceptible to
indoctrination" than schoolchildren and so their choices need no
greater scrutiny than the Zelman Court provided. But the analogy is
misleading for two reasons. First, the issue of susceptibility focuses
attention on the wrong point in time. It is no doubt true that children, captive in schools for many hours per day and many weeks per
year, are vulnerable to indoctrination; but Zelman means that, in a
properly designed voucher program, parents and children are free to
choose their preferred source of indoctrination. The voucher model
is not focused on susceptibility per se. Instead, the model is concerned with susceptibility to state influence at a particular point in
time-when the participant is deciding what kind of experience to
accept in the chosen school or program, not when the participant has
already entered it.
This first mistake leads into the second problem with the court's
analogy. The court misleads through its contrast between the adult
offender and the schoolchild, suggesting that because the offenders
are adults, they have greater capacity to give meaningful consent than
the schoolchildren. Schoolchildren do not make the decision alone
on which school to attend; indeed the decision must be made by their
parents. These parents certainly face the legal pressure of compulsory
school attendance laws and the practical pressure that arises from
their desire to have their children attend safe and challenging
schools, and yet the Zelman Court did not think those pressures coerced parents into choosing religious options.
Contrast those pressures, however, with the context in which the
DOC offender chooses. To begin with, the offender is by definition a
substance abuser, perhaps even struggling with the symptoms of withdrawal. This physical condition itself may impair the capacity for
choice, and such an impairment may be most severe in those cases in
which long-term residential treatment is warranted. Moreover, the of-
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fender receives a recommendation to attend a religious facility from a
state agent, one who holds the power to recommend significantly
greater restrictions on the offender, including incarceration, if the offender fails to meet the conditions set for parole or probation. Even
though the agent is required to inform the offender of a secular alternative, the DOC agent's expressed preference may well impinge on
31 3
the "genuinely private and independent" choice of the offender.
In an opinion released just as this article was going to press, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's ruling in favor of the Wisconsin DOC.3 1 4 The opinion, by
Judge Richard Posner, held that the DOC program was constitutionally acceptable, because the program relied on beneficiary choice as a
mechanism for channeling funds to Faith Works, and because beneficiaries had (as Zelman requires) a genuine and independent choice
between Faith Works and other, secular treatment centers. Judge Posner emphasized certain key features of the program. First, parole officers, who offer to offenders the choice between incarceration or
treatment, and the further choice among treatment options, made
only "nonbinding recommendations" to offenders.3 15 The evidence
revealed that when these officers made such recommendations of
Faith Works, they explained that the program has a Christian element
and they were obliged to offer "a secular halfway house as an alternative."3 " Furthermore, the plaintiffs presented no evidence that religious bias, rather than a good faith appraisal of the treatment
programs and their appropriateness for particular offenders, had influenced these recommendations. Second, Judge Posner concluded
that recommendations of Faith Works, based in part on the fact that it
was the only long-term program available, should not be considered
313 Judge Crabb's analytic lapse may be attributable in part to the plaintiffs failure
to litigate the choice question more thoroughly. The plaintiff, like other advocates
for the Separationist position, may not have fully internalized the legal changes produced by Zelnan and other recent decisions. (Notably, the plaintiffs did not call any
of the offenders as witnesses and did not file a brief with the court after Zelman was
handed down.)
314 Freedom From Religion Found. v. McCallum, No. 02-3102, 2003 U.S. LEXIS
6301 (7th Cir. Apr. 2, 2003) (Posnerj.). The Seventh Circuit's Faith Works opinion
has the potential to be very significant. An opinion from Judge Posner on a question
of first impression, which the Faith Works case represents, will influence other judges
confronted with the same question, and may influence decisions by potential plaintiffs on whether or not to litigate about such questions. Moreover, the extension of
Zelman so robustly to faith-intensive social services other than education will provide a
legal boost to the President's proposed drug treatment plan.
315 Id. at *2.
316 i.
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impermissible steering to, and government preference for, religious
over secular programs.3 17 Religious programs should not be punished
for their generosity or quality, or be given incentives to reduce their
services in order to be no more desirable than the secular options. If
all options had to be equal in this way, Judge Posner reasoned, there
would be a race to the bottom, as secular programs continuously reduced what they offered in order to disqualify the potentially superior
religious options for among those that officers could recommend. 3 18
In his view, offenders are not "coerced" into choosing religious options by the fact that these options might be superior in their effectiveness, or by the fact that parole officers communicate the relative
effectiveness of options to guide the offenders' choices.
In some respects, we think the opinion is admirable, and appears
correct on the record before the Seventh Circuit. The opinion emphasizes the importance of providing secular as well as religious options to offenders, the potential hazards of official bias in the process
of recommending options, and the constitutional acceptability of having religious options with features that may make them more desirable than the secular choices available at a given moment. The
Supreme Court's Zelman opinion made evident that challengers to
such a program have the burden of persuasion if they assert the lack
of "genuine and independent private choice,"3 19 and the plaintiffs in
the Faith Works case did not satisfy that burden.
Nevertheless, other courts may be a bit disquieted by the tone
and approach reflected in this opinion. First, it is considerably less
sensitive than it might have been to the government's obligation to
remain neutral on the presence or absence of religion in the program. If a race to the bottom is a concern, which it may be, so too is
the government's affirmative responsibility to avoid judgments that religion qua religion may be appropriate for some people under its control. Moreover, the opinion conflates official recommendations about
schools with recommendations about drug treatment facilities,3-29 even
though faith-based drug treatment is designed to be far more transformative of religious identity than is typical of many religious schools.
317

Id. at *6-7.
Id. at *9-10.

318
319 See supra discussion Part I.B.l.a.iii.
320 McCallum, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 6301, at *6 ("If recommending a religious institution constituted an establishment of religion, a public school guidance counselor
could not recommend that a student apply to a Catholic college even if the counselor
thought that the particular college would be the best choice for the particular
student.").
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This quality should lead the state to be scrupulously mindful of concerns about neutrality and potential coercion of beneficiaries 21'
Despite Zelman's broad warrant to uphold the constitutionality of
voucher programs, we think that courts in the future should examine
issues of "independent choice" more carefully, especially when the
choosers may be suffering cognitive incapacities. Although Zelman
counsels strongly against close judicial evaluation of the relative merits
of secular versus religious providers, it does not preclude examining
participants' capacity for choice. 3 22 Moreover, as we have argued elsewhere,3 3 the state should be held to a duty to take affirmative steps to
ensure the presence of secular options. This duty was satisfied in
Zelman by the wide range of public school choices in Cleveland, but
voucher programs for social services, frequently lacking these publicly
operated counterparts, may present entirely different circumstances.
Zelman, especially as applied in McCallum II, suggests that vouchers are indeed the path of least constitutional resistance for government partnerships with faith-intensive providers. As noted in Part
I.B, however, voucher programs are likely to face significant political
controversy when proposed for any social service, education or otherwise. Although providers in such programs have in the past tended to
get less governmental scrutiny and control than those working under
2 4
directgovernment grantsv)
more widespread use of vouchers in the
future will likely invite an increase in regulatory attention. Just as in
the case of education, civil rights advocates will press for restrictions
on the employment practices of service providers, targeting those
providers who discriminate in favor of co-religionists and against gays
and lesbians.125 Moreover, any expansion of social services to include
321 In another case about substance abuse treatment, on a different factual record,
a different outcome is distinctly possible. To be sure, the Supreme Court's opinion in
Zeiman did little to encourage the lower courts to examine indirect funding programs
so carefully. But a careful reading of Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion might
lead some lower courts to do just that. For discussion of the ways in which that opinion differs from the Court's opinion, see supra Part I.B.2.
322 Cf Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970) (stating that capacity of class of
welfare recipients to communicate orally as compared to in writing should shape the
requirements of procedural due process in welfare hearings).
323 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 9, at 596-605.
324 For discussion of this phenomenon in the context of vouchers for child care,
see Douglas Besharov & Nazanin Samari, Child Care Vouchers and Cash Payments, in
VOUCHERS AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES 195, 206-10 (C. Eugene Steuerle et

al. eds., 2000).
325 For example, in Belmore v. United Methodist Children's Home of the North Georgia
Conference, No. 2002-CV-56474 (Super. Ct., Fulton County, Ga. filed July 31, 2002),
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund filed suit against officials of the State of
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voucher arrangements at faith-based organizations may well invite new
demands for accountability of providers. Here, too, the rules of neutrality, presumptively requiring the same treatment of secular and religious providers, will control.
In addition, voucher programs are less likely than direct grants
and contracts to induce faith-based organizations into the service
arena. Unlike fixed-price contracts, vouchers cannot provide seed
money to start new programs or provide a stable financial base on
which to build a service program. From the perspective of providers,
vouchers may be constitutionally secure but economically unpromising. From the perspective of government administrators, eager to
lure new groups of providers into the regime of charitable choice,
vouchers may not have the quick and large payoff that agencies would
like, whether for reasons of publicity, patronage, or provision of
service.
Whatever the political dynamics, Zelman virtually guarantees that
vouchers will play a central role in the ongoing debate over the role of
faith-based organizations in government-financed social service. If
this or any other administration, state or federal, wants a "level playing
field" for religious and non-religious organizations, vouchers have become the constitutionally appropriate route. Political resistance to efforts to go down this path will surely emerge, but constitutionally
knowledgeable administrators are already preparing their voucher
plans as a way to include faith-intensive organizations in a variety of
social services.

32 6

Georgia, alleging that the State had unconstitutionally financed the care of foster
children in a Methodist Children's Home that discriminated against non-Christians
and against those who did not share its view of homosexuality. See News Releases,
Lambda Legal (Aug. 1, 2002), at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record= 1108. For our comment on the Bellmore litigation, see Legal
Analysis, Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy (Sept. 19, 2002), at
http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/legal/legal-update.cfin?id= 11. Moreover,
battles over the scope of employment discrimination laws as applied to faith-based
providers have been a central impediment to current legislative proposals to expand
charitable choice. Editorial, Bush's Conversion; He Welcomes a Scaled-Down "Faith-Based
Bill", Prm-rsBuRGH POST-GAZE'VrE, Feb. 12, 2002, at A10; Glen Elsasser, Many Lack Faith
in Charity Plan; Bush Faces Uphill Fight for Program, C. TRM., Apr. 16, 2001, at N8;
Mary Leonard, In the End, a 'No' to Faith-Based Funding; Church-State Unease Gradually
Undercut Bush's Touted Plan on CharitableAid, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 23, 2001, at D1;
Mark O'Keefe, Another Trouble Spot for Charitable Choice: Hiring Policies; Would Groups
Have To Employ Non-Believfs?, DALLAS MORNING" NEWS, May 5, 2001, at G5. We expect

that proposals to use vouchers to pay for social services rendered at faith-based organizations would invite a similar debate.
326 See White House Fact Sheet, supra note 296 (White House statement on proposed voucher program for substance abuse); see aLho.jane Eisner, Making Marriagethe
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CONCI ,USION

Zelman is thinly reasoned, but it presents a key that opens many
doors. The opportunities it presents are both theoretical and practical. On the theoretical side, the decision may force a long overdue
reconsideration, by judges and others, of Establishment Clause premises and principles. The pervasive anti-Catholic sentiment that drove
Separationism from the 1940s to the 1980s is well behind us, but questions of religion's distinctive place in our constitutional ethos remain.
And the tangled issues of the relationship between federal and state
constitutional law, now squarely framed by government's financial relations with religious entities, offer a rich context in which to think
through afresh a set of questions as old as the Republic.
On the practical side, the opportunities seem even more pressing. Lawyers and judges have the luxury of watching and waiting as
new principles emerge and work themselves pure. By contrast, those
who must make practical decisions about how and where we educate
our children-especially children whose family wealth puts them in a
disadvantageous position-and how we care for the least fortunate
among us, do not enjoy such luxury. They face formidable challenges
in reconciling those concerns with appropriate limits on state power
in dealing with religious entities.

Choice for Parents; Church Can PlayV a Role, Especially Among Blacks, PH-lILA. INQUIRER, July
14, 2002, at Cl (attributing to Wade Horn, Assistant Secretaiy fbr Children and Families, Administration for Children and Families, U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, a plan to promote vouchers for premarital counseling).

